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Abstract
Since 1991, one-to-four unit properties in the area of Dorchester served by the Codman Square
Neighborhood Development Corporation have suffered over 400 foreclosures, with nearly one third of
those properties foreclosed on by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). This wave of foreclosures threatens to
devastate affected neighborhoods with the loss of housing units to irresponsible landlords, abandonment
and arson. Many of these foreclosures resulted from excessively easy access to credit during the 1980's for
short-term speculative purchasers.
In this thesis, I examined the data for the 123 properties foreclosed upon by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
to show that the majority of them were triple-deckers owned by investors who bought in the mid-to-late
1980's. I interviewed lenders and real estate brokers to learn how these risky borrowers obtained credit,
that loans often received little underwriting and that buyers, sellers, brokers and mortgage originators
made many fraudulent deals that were then passed on to the secondary markets. I interviewed additional
lenders as well as representatives from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to learn about their quality control
practices and their relationships with mortgage lenders. I conclude that in the "unbundled" mortgage
market that has existed since the mid-1980's, where most of the players have only a short-term interest in
a given loan, there are few incentives to make sure that every loan is prudently underwritten.
Finally, I address the question of why Dorchester suffers so much more than other places from this
unbundled mortgage market. I conlude that Dorchester's market for triple-deckers is unusual because
there is weak demand among long-term investors (owner-occupant and absentee), leaving an opportunity
for short-term, speculative investors to set prices in the market. When these individuals not only set
prices but also receive credit easily, all buyers are forced to pay more and the market climbs as it did in
the 1980's. When the market inevitably turns down, as in the early 1990's, the long-term investors are
most severely affected, making an already weak market even less desirable. To prevent similar disasters
from happening in the future, the secondary markets need to identify at-risk neighborhoods and need to
force speculative investors need to risk more of their own cash on their investments.
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Title: Professor, Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Foreclosures as an Element of Neighborhood Destabilization in
Dorchester
A walk down Bloomfield Street, which runs from Greenbrier Street near Dorchester's
Four Corners to Geneva Avenue near Fields Corner, first takes you past a well-kept single
family home. Although the outside could benefit from repainting, the owner has put time
and care into the maintenance and upkeep of her property. The triple-decker directly
across the street, however, is a different story. The porch sags and the front yard is filled
with tall weeds and abandoned car tires, both signs that the house is either vacant or
owned by someone who does not maintain it. The next few homes are in fair shape,
inhabited but in need of repairs, and halfway down the block is a vacant lot filled with
garbage and weeds. The lower half of the block is neater, with freshly painted homes,
flowers blooming and less garbage, but the street ends at a large vacant lot that stretches
all the way up Geneva Avenue from Bloomfield Street to Tonawanda, the next side street
towards Field's Corner.
At eight o'clock on a Friday morning, who is outside? One family of four is getting into its
car, strapping a toddler and an infant into their respective seats for the trip to day care
while the parents go to work. Other families wait for school buses with their children. At
5:30 on a late spring afternoon, who is outside? Some of these families, black and white,
Hispanic and Asian, are returning from work. Others carry bags of groceries back from
the nearby Purity Supreme. A group of young men sits on a porch, watching passersby
and talking about the latest movies. Teenagers walk by on their way home from school.
Some exchange insults with the young men on the porch, one of whom says, "I'll catch up
with you! You better be watching your back!"
What do people say about their neighborhood? One young mother, who has owned a
home on the street for seven years, says, "I like my neighborhood. It's convenient to my
job, and I like my children to live among all different kinds of people. But I don't feel as
safe as I used to. I don't walk home from the T late at night anymore, especially since that
young boy was shot last winter." On nearby Tonawanda Street, another long-time
resident says he is ready to move because he is "tired of telling my kids that they can't go
out to play anymore." A mile south on upscale Ashmont Hill, a 20-year resident tells of a
house next door to hers on which the owner was foreclosed. Since the original owner left,
a loan shark in Roxbury has taken possession of the property and operates it as a boarding
house whose clientele include prostitutes and drug addicts. The next-door neighbor and
her family recently spent a sleepless night when one of the men in the house fought with
one of the prostitutes, causing the police to arrive at 3:00 a.m. The neighbor says that her
children don't need to watch police shows to see urban violence because they can just stay
home ...
Destabilization in a neighborhood like Dorchester takes a variety of forms, including
decreased public safety, weakened retail services, vacant lots, abandoned buildings,
foreclosures, and middle class flight. Destabilization also has a variety of causes, including
crime, disinvestment, speculation, and lack of community organization. Housing is a key
component in any effort to fight destabilization in a neighborhood. If there are stable,
well-organized homeowners in a neighborhood, they not only maintain the housing stock
but they also support local businesses and fight to keep crime and other problems out of
their neighborhoods. On the other hand, in a neighborhood like Dorchester, which is
heavily investor-owned and has suffered from the long-term effects of real estate
speculation and abandonment, housing can also be a major source of blight and instability.
In the spring of 1993, the Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation,
which serves a two-square mile section of southern Dorchester, decided that it needed to
find a way to respond to the foreclosure, abandonment, increased crime and middle class
flight that it was observing in the neighborhoods that it represents. As a community
development corporation (CDC), the organization saw its appropriate role as focusing its
efforts on improving and securing stable ownership of the neighborhood's housing stock as
a way to begin to fight destabilization. The NDC hired two graduate student interns' to
research the neighborhood's housing stock as well as its vacant lots and to examine some
programmatic options for rehabilitating and developing the one-to-four family housing
stock in its neighborhood. The interns focused their research on the NDC's service area,
which is bounded by Geneva Avenue and Columbia Road on the north, Blue Hill Avenue
on the west, Morton Street and Gallivan Boulevard in the south, and Dorchester Avenue
on the east. Encompassing several distinct neighborhoods, from the Victorian mansions of
Ashmont Hill to the vacant lots of Erie-Ellington, this service area houses a diverse group
of people, black and white, poor, middle class and wealthy.
One of the results of this research was the finding that the agency's service area had
suffered a very high level of foreclosures on one-to-four family properties beginning in
1991, with 150 in the six-month period of January to June 1993, and over 400
foreclosures during the years 1989 through 1993. Furthermore, even given the income
diversity of the sub-neighborhoods within the Codman Square NDC's service area, the
properties were scattered throughout it rather than being clustered in specific
neighborhoods. In addition, roughly one third of the properties had been foreclosed on by
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the two government-sponsored enterprises that
dominate the secondary mortgage market in the United States. The NDC wanted to know
IThe interns were the author and Michael Feloney.
more about this set of properties and the reasons behind their foreclosure, and in particular
to understand why the secondary markets were foreclosing on so many homes in
Dorchester.
This new focus on the foreclosure issue represents the Codman Square NDC's renewed
interest in one-to-four family housing as a crucial component of neighborhood
stabilization. When it was founded in 1981, the NDC focused much of its attention on
smaller properties, but in recent years has concentrated more on large multifamily
buildings as well as commercial development. However, in addition to the organization's
interest in neighborhood stabilization, more than 70% of the housing stock in its service
area is made up of small properties, and therefore the one-to-four family stock merits the
attention of local developers such as the Codman Square NDC. Since last summer, the
NDC has begun to explore ways to get reinvolved in the one-to-four family housing stock,
and is now pursuing financing from LISC and the Boston Community Loan Fund to
rehabilitate and sell small properties to first-time owner-occupant homebuyers.
While the CDC looks forward to an opportunity to put some of the foreclosed and
abandoned housing stock back into the hands of responsible owners, it will probably only
be able to develop this housing at the rate of three to five buildings per year. With
foreclosures happening at the rate of 150 in six months, however, three to five buildings
can barely make a dent in the foreclosure problem. In addition, the loss of value in
Dorchester's housing market, recession-based layoffs among lower-income workers, and
neighborhood problems such as crime and blight all raise serious questions about the
strength of the first-time homebuyer market in Codman Square's service area. The NDC
understands that while it seeks to rebuild the physical captial and homeownership base it
must also seek out the systemic problems in the local real estate market and the mortgage
market that contribute to destabilization. This understanding has intensified the NDC staff
and board of directors' interest in learning more about the explanations for this high
foreclosure rate, and in particular to be able to explain the high foreclosure rate among
properties owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since that portfolio is such a high
percentage of the foreclosures.
A brief examination of the title histories of some of the properties foreclosed upon by
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae showed that the majority of these properties were absentee-
owned rather than owner-occupied. This discovery led to some additional questions.
First, what did the title and tenure histories look like for the entire portfolio of 123
properties foreclosed upon by the government-sponsored enterprises between 1989 and
1993? Second, if so many investors were being foreclosed upon, and mortgage loans for
investors are considered riskier and are therefore supposed to be priced higher than
mortgage loans for owner-occupants, the NDC wondered whether these loans had been
appropriately priced in terms of interest rates and especially loan-to-value ratios. Third,
the NDC wanted to know which banks or mortgage companies had originated the
mortgages and whether those were origination companies that were known for making
high-risk and even fraudulent loans. Fourth, if there were problems with these loans from
the beginning, how did the secondary market end up buying them? Were there loopholes
in the mortgage market that might allow badly or fraudulently underwritten loans to make
their way into the secondary market agencies' portfolios? Fifth, what were the specific
characteristics of the real estate market in Dorchester that made it vulnerable to
speculative investment and the foreclosure that ultimately results from those purchases?
These are the questions that I intend to explore in this thesis. By studying the foreclosure
problem and its relationship to the secondary mortgage market, and by focusing on
investor-owned properties, I believe that my research represents a departure from the
existing body of literature on mortgage lending in low-income and minority
neighborhoods, for two reasons. First, this is not a consumer issue, like the "second
mortgage scam" in which homeowners were swindled into signing away their homes to
finance companies and home-improvement contractors. Second, the issues dealt with in
this thesis move away from the research around redlining, which documents instances in
which minority borrowers are denied mortgage credit based on their neighborhood and the
color of their skin. Rather, this thesis will try to explore whether investors in particular
kinds of real estate markets have had access to credit that is inappropriately matched with
the value of the investment or the riskiness of the borrower, and to explain what the effect
of this inappropriate credit has been on the overall housing market in the neighborhood.
To look analytically at the "credit" issue it is necessary to understand the basic
characteristics of the neighborhood's housing stock and income levels, examine the data on
foreclosed properties in the neighborhood, and analyze the institutions that provide credit
to purchasers of properties in the neighborhood to see how they affect the neighborhood.
Therefore, the thesis will include the following components. Chapter One describes
census data and historic information on Dorchester, including previous destabilization
experiences such as the Boston Bankers Urban Renewal Group and the second mortgage
scam. The second chapter will explore the data on foreclosures by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, present some comparative data from the city of Somerville, and offer some
possible reasons for the high foreclosure rate, leading up to an introduction of the role of
the modern mortgage market in the foreclosure problem. The third chapter provides a
background and overview of the secondary mortgage market, its history and operations.
The fourth chapter uses information from interviews with lenders and secondary market
officials to describe the "unbundled" mortgage market, in which the functions of
origination, servicing, credit risk and investment are separated, thereby failing to create an
incentive for most of the players in the market to consider the long-term implications of
their lending and servicing practices. Finally, the conclusions will explore the connections
between the mortgage market and the foreclosures, offer an economic and institutional
model to understand the special characteristics of the Codman Square real estate market,
and offer some recommendations for initiatives to prevent some of the problems outlined
in the thesis from happening again in the future.
CHAPTER ONE
Census Data and History of Dorchester
Dorchester: A General Description and a Brief History
At 6.03 square miles, Dorchester is the largest neighborhood in the City of Boston. After
Allston-Brighton, it is also the city's second most populated neighborhood, with 85,641
residents. The neighborhood stretches from South Boston on its northeastern edge, to the
South End and Roxbury on its northwestern borders, to Franklin Park and Mattapan on its
western and southern boundaries, to the Neponset River and the city of Quincy on its
southeastern boundary, and along the Atlantic Ocean on its eastern side.
Founded as a separate town two months prior to the founding of Boston in 1630,
Dorchester's rolling hills were originally farmland. In its second century, the town played
an historic role in the Revolutionary War; one of the main north-south streets, Washington
Street, is so named because George Washington used it in the defense of Dorchester
Heights. During its first three centuries, its economy included shipbuilding, barrelmaking,
rope making, grist mills and a chocolate factory. In the 19th century, wealthy Bostonians
began to build their "cottages" on Dorchester's hills overlooking the sea. Later that
century, the arrival of the railroads helped to encourage suburban development in
Dorchester. As the streetcar system developed, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
the area became home to many workers who commuted to Boston on Dorchester's
streetcar system. The area experienced rapid growth during this period; upon
Dorchester's annexation to the City of Boston in 1870, barely 10,000 people lived there,
but 50 years later that number had swelled to 250,000.2
2Maria Karagianis, "In Defense of Dorchester: An Appreciation of Life in a Boston Neighborhood," The
Boston Globe Magazine, Sunday, December 26, 1993, pp. 13-15; Patrick Cooke et al, Living in
Dorchester.
Dorchester has always been home to a variety of ethnic groups. First settled by Yankees,
the area became home during the 19th and 20th centuries to thousands of Irish
immigrants. During the 1920's, western Dorchester and Mattapan began to be settled by
Italians and later by Jews moving south from Roxbury, followed in the 1960's, 1970's and
1980's by African-Americans as well as immigrants from Latin America, the Caribbean and
Southeast Asia. Today, the neighborhoods west of Washington Street are mainly African-
American, Cape Verdean and Caribbean, those between Washington Street and
Dorchester Avenue house a mix of racial and ethnic groups, and the areas east of
Dorchester Avenue are largely white and Irish Catholic. 3
Dorchester's architecture includes many historic commercial and residential buildings.
Neighborhoods like Ashmont Hill contain beautifully preserved mansions, some of which
include ballrooms, stained glass windows, and parquet floors. These were the homes of
wealthy pre-Victorian and Victorian Bostonians. Much of Dorchester is also
characterized by the boxlike triple deckers that were built in the late 19th and early 20th
century as housing for laborers and their families. Since most of the housing stock dates
from the pre-World War II period and earlier, expensive repairs are not uncommon to
make older homes livable.
Although it is considered a neighborhood in itself, Dorchester is in reality many small
neighborhoods, including Codman Square, Lower Mills, Ashmont Hill, Jones Hill,
Meetinghouse Hill, Field's Corner, Upham's Corner, Savin Hill and others. Many of these
neighborhoods have their own commercial centers, depicted on the map in Exhibit One.
In addition, many residents of Dorchester, even those who are not Catholic, traditionally
identify themselves by the parish that they come from: St. Margaret's, St. Brendan's, St.
3Karagianis, p. 14.
Mark's, St. Matthew's, St. Angela's.4
This thesis will focus upon the part of Dorchester contained within the Codman Square
Neighborhood Development Corporation's service area, which covers approximately two
square miles of Dorchester's southern and central regions and contains nearly half of
Dorchester's population. The service area runs from Geneva Avenue and Columbia Road
on the north, to Morton Street and Gallivan Boulevard on its southern side. On the east,
the service area runs to Dorchester Avenue, and on the west, it is bounded by Blue Hill
Avenue. For a map of Dorchester with the Codman Square NDC's service area,
highlighted, please see Exhibit Two.
As of the 1990 census, there were approximately 41,252 people living in the service area
in a total of 14,399 units of housing. Like much of Dorchester, the Codman Square
NDC's service area is characterized by small-scale housing; 78% of the units in the service
area are in 1-4 family buildings. Furthermore, there is an abundance of 3-4 family housing,
with 42% of the total housing stock contained within a 3-or 4-unit property. Finally, the
housing stock in the service area is quite old, with 61% of it built prior to 1939.5
The neighborhoods within these two square miles are widely varied. They include the run-
down streets and vacant lots of Four Corners (Washington Street and Bowdoin Street),
where shopkeeper Manuel Monteiro lost his life last March when a gunman was
disappointed at only finding $4 in the shop's cash register, to the mansions of Wellesley
Park and Ashmont Hill. Most neighborhoods are somewhere in-between, with a mix of
housing quality and safety levels.
4Karagianis, p. 14.
5Barcan, Sara and Michael Feloney, Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation,
Neighborhood Stabilization Project, October 1993, pp. 2-3.
In addition, residents with a variety of income levels live in the Codman Square NDC's
service area. Within the twelve census tracts that roughly make up the area, 1989 median
household incomes range from just $16,731 in a tract in the south/southwest part of the
service area, to $43,050 in a northeastern census tract. The mean of all 12 medians is
$27,849. Similarly, when we look at the numbers of families living below the poverty
level, the number ranges from 8.2% of the total population in a southeastern census tract,
to 40.4% in the same south/southwestern tract that also has the lowest household income.
Finally, the average household income of an owner-occupant of a housing unit in the
census tract is nearly twice that of a renter, at $47,086 vs. $25,552.6
The Codman Square NDC's service area also has a nagging vacant lot problem so severe
that the CDC believes that a strategy to deal with it is crucial to any attempt to stabilize
the neighborhood. As of July 1993, the service area contained approximately 750 city-
owned vacant lots out of a total of 3,000 citywide.7 Although the lots are scattered
around the service area, some streets and neighborhoods have large clusters. Erie and
Ellington Streets, in the northwestern part of the service area, together contain 62 vacant
lots, or 8% of the total vacant lots in the service area. While this neighborhood is getting
some new construction as the Mt. Bowdoin-Glenway Neighborhood Housing Services
finishes up its Jacob's Place homeownership project, it is by far the exception. In a time
with almost no new construction anywhere in the Boston area, and with a large stock of
bank-owned and abandoned housing units that provide cheaper opportunities to produce
affordable housing, there is little hope that these vacant lots will ever be rebuilt. While a
few may become tot lots or community gardens, or be taken over by neighbors who wish
to enlarge their yard space, most will remain vacant.
61990 Census.
7Barcan and Feloney, p. 10-11. It should be noted that the service area also contains privately-owned
vacant lots, but there is no accurate count of this group of lots.
Neighborhood Destabilization in Dorchester: From B-BURG to Vacant Lots
Vacant Lots. The vacant lot problem becomes even more troubling given the usual
origins: the end result of a process of foreclosure, abandonment, vandalism and arson.
Although this thesis does not include data on the origins of each of the vacant lots in the
Codman Square service area, many of them are likely the result of the last wave of
foreclosure and abandonment in the neighborhood during the 1970's. This cause-and-
effect relationship between foreclosure, abandonment and the ultimate loss of housing
units as well as the spread of blight in the form of trash-filled lots and the burned-out or
distressed structures that often become vacant lots helps to explain why the people who
live and work in Dorchester are so alarmed by the high rates of foreclosures that they have
witnessed in their neighborhoods since the early 1990's. Many residents believe that if
they do not stop the foreclosures and ensure that foreclosed property is maintained and
owned by responsible owners, they will lose additional units of housing, and ultimately
"lose" additional sections of their neighborhoods to vacancy, abandonment and blight.
B-BURG. Another reason why people at the Codman Square NDC and people who live
within its service area are so alarmed about the current rash of foreclosures is that they
know that this is not the first time Dorchester's housing stock has suffered destabilization.
In 1968, a group of 22 area banks known as the Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group (B-
BURG) targeted South Dorchester and Mattapan, the neighborhood just southwest of
Dorchester, for a redlining scheme to sell $29 million worth of Federal Housing
Administration-insured mortgages to black residents. The portion of the B-BURG lending
area that overlaps with the Codman Square NDC's service area is the portion of the
district south of Talbot Avenue and west of Norfolk Street; this area was largely Jewish at
the time. B-BURG's bankers steered minority buyers to the areas within the maps that the
consortium provided. As participants in the program later revealed, going outside the line
by even one block was not allowed; if a black family showed interest in a house outside of
the map's boundaries, they were told that they would not receive a mortgage in that area.8
Most of the sectors of the real estate sales industry, including brokers, appraisers and
lenders, preyed upon buyers and sellers. Real estate brokers swarmed into Mattapan to
hasten the departure of the area's Jewish residents through scare tactics. By frightening an
already skittish community into believing that they needed to sell immediately or lose all of
their property value, brokers commonly bought houses cheaply and marked them up for
sale to black families. With guaranteed financing, it was easy to find buyers among a black
population that had been squeezed out by urban renewal in Roxbury and gentrification in
the South End, or who simply saw a long-desired opportunity to move up and out of
poorer and more densely-populated sections of the city. In addition, there was widespread
fraud among the FHA's appraisers, who commonly overappraised properties and ignored
serious structural flaws. Higher appraisals meant higher mortgages, which was fine with
the banks, who made a 1% fee for every mortgage they wrote. It is estimated that 65% of
the homes sold under B-BURG required significant repairs within two years after their
sale.9
B-BURG devastated the housing stock of the area within its boundaries, as well as the
buyers who purchased the homes. With little or no equity and low cash reserves to deal
with expensive repairs, many B-BURG buyers either abandoned their homes or were
foreclosed upon. During the early 1970's nearly three quarters of all B-BURG
homeowners failed to maintain their payments. 10 With FHA's protection, the banks had
nothing to lose, and foreclosed on over one thousand homes within the B-BURG line.
8Hillel Levine and Lawrence Harmon, The Death of An American Jewish Community: A Tragedy of
Good Intentions, New York, The Free Press, 1992, pp. 167-180.
9Levine and Harmon, pp.207-208.
10Levine and Harmon, p. 267.
According to Hillel Levine and Larry Harmon, chroniclers of the B-BURG debacle, the
local HUD office typically took over foreclosed homes after reimbursing the banks for
their losses, but was unprepared to manage the properties. The authors say that "[t]he
solution of choice.. .became condemnation - whatever the actual condition of the house.
Vandals and arsonists practiced their craft, for both fun and profit."" The result was
vacant lots, abandoned, deteriorated properties, and unstable property ownership patterns.
Dorchester continues to suffer the repercussions of B-BURG. Vacant lots dot the
landscape, many older homes desperately need repairs, and real estate brokers, home
improvement contractors and lenders still find opportunities to exploit a housing stock
where owner-occupants have few resources and have had difficulty taking hold. In 1991,
the so-called "Second Mortgage Scam" came to light when Massachusetts Attorney
General Scott Harshbarger began investigating a series of foreclosures by banks, loan
sharks and small contracting companies on hundreds of low-income and mainly elderly
homeowners in Dorchester, Mattapan, Roxbury and Jamaica Plain.
Second-Mortgage Scam. Although there were numerous patterns of fraud that preceded
the foreclosures, the typical modus operandi for these scams was as follows. First, an
elderly or low-income homeowner, usually one who had lived in his or her home for
enough years to build up some equity, would receive a visit from a contractor, who would
tell the homeowner that he had noticed the home needed some repairs and that he could
do both the financing and the repair work. In neighborhoods where minority residents
have traditionally had difficulty accessing home equity loans from banks or other forms of
credit for home improvement, such a pitch was often appealing. The homeowner would
then sign a loan document to borrow money from the contractor or the finance company
11Levine and Harmon, p. 333.
for which he worked, without realizing that the document was actually a mortgage, giving
the contractor a lien on the home.
After the homeowner entered into a contract with the contractor and his finance company,
one or more of the following scenarios occurred. The contractor might fail to do the
work, or complete only part of the work and then stop, or demand more money to
continue working, or complete such shoddy work that the homeowner would need to find
another contractor to redo the job. Since many of the mortgages were written at interest
rates well above market rate, as high as 18 or 25%, with as many as forty points on the
loans, it was inevitable that many homeowners would default on their mortgages, and that
the contractors, finance companies or banks such as Fleet that had purchased these
mortgages would foreclose. Sometimes the homeowner paid the fraudulent mortgage
after receiving threats of violence from the second mortgage holder, but defaulted on a
first mortgage. It is possible to drive around the streets of Dorchester and pick out which
houses have been "scammed;" they are characterized by such details as half-finished siding
jobs, and most of them are clearly abandoned.
The consciousness among long-time residents of the terrible devastation that B-BURG
and the second mortgage scams have left in their paths makes them acutely sensitive to the
potential for disaster that today's foreclosures represent. The legacies of these disasters
create an obligation for Dorchester residents, housing advocates, and all those who care
about the future of urban neighborhoods to understand what has created the foreclosure
and abandonment problems of the 1990's, in order to prevent additional threats to
neighborhood stability in Dorchester. In order to start to analyze the current wave of
foreclosures, it is necessary to understand not only the foreclosures themselves and the
characteristics of the foreclosed properties, but also to rtudy the peculiarities of the
Dorchester real estate market so that we can begin to distinguish between the market as it
operates normally and the market as it is affected by experiences such as B-BURG, the
second-mortgage scam and the real estate crash of the late 1980's and early 1990's.
Finally, it is important to approach this study with a clear understanding of the limitations
of public policy. A single CDC in Codman Square is not capable of dealing with a
thousand vacant lots and abandoned properties in its service area, nor can it control the
drugs, crime and poverty that make Dorchester a less desirable place for homeowners to
purchase property than places like West Roxbury or Milton. It can, however, educate
itself about the problems in its local real estate market, figure out whether there are
speculators in the market receiving access to easy credit, and use that knowledge to
advocate change in the private and public institutions that control local markets. It is in
this spirit that I have conducted the research contained in the following chapters.
CHAPTER TWO
Foreclosure Data and Analysis in Codman Square Service Area
This chapter examines the one-to-three-family home foreclosures in Dorchester by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac within the Codman Square service area from 1989 through January
1994. I will first present the data on foreclosures, as well as the information on lenders,
occupancy, and the history of transactions on each property. Included in this section will
be two mini-case studies in the form of title searches. Second, I will provide a
comparative case study with similar statistics for the city of Somerville. Finally, I will
discuss some of the possible reasons for the high level of secondary market foreclosures in
the neighborhood. For a full explanation of the methodology used to gather foreclosure
data, please turn to Exhibit Three.
Foreclosure Statistics for Codman Square NDC Service Area
Between mid-1989 and January 1994, there were over 400 foreclosures, representing
nearly one quarter of all real estate transactions, on 1-3 family properties in the Codman
Square NDC's service area. 12 For a map depicting the locations of foreclosures in
Codman Square between January 1990 and June 1993, please turn to Exhibit Four. Of
these, 123 were foreclosed upon by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Thus, the two
secondary market agencies were responsible for close to one third of the area's
foreclosures during the last five years. Although ideally we would like to know what
percentage of all loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Codman Square
servicea area these loans represent, it was not possible to obtain this information from the
12As the methodology section explains, the period for examination is based upon availability of on-line
data, since Banker and Tradesman did not record foreclosure data in a readily recognizable way until mid-
1989. Also, I have included one, two and three-unit properties only because the data service lumps four-
unit properties together with 5-8 unit properties.
two secondary market agencies.13 For a database showing the history of transactions,
mortgage originators, property owners, number of units and ownership status at time of
foreclosure on each of these properties, please turn to Exhibit Five.
Of the foreclosed-upon Dorchester properties, 72 or 63% are 3-family houses, 15 or 13%
are 2-family houses, and 27 or 24% are single family homes.14 According to the 1990
census, the breakdown of properties in the 12 census tracts that are roughly coterminous
with the service area is as follows: of the 13,534 one-to-four family properties in the area,
2709 or 20% are single family, 26.% or 3560 are 2-family, and 7265 or 54% are 3-4
family properties.15 Therefore, both single family homes and triple-deckers are
overrepresented in the foreclosure numbers.16
The following contingency table shows the breakdown of ownership category by property
type among the properties foreclosed upon by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The four
columns show the types of ownership, and the three rows show the property types. The
13The ideal way to figure out what percentage of all Fannie/Freddie loans these loans represent would be
to take the number of loans purchased by Fannie and Freddie in a given year as the denominator, and take
the number of foreclosed properties from the Fannie/Freddie loans purchased that year as the numerator.
The result of that division would be the foreclosure rate for that year. However, even if it had been
possible to obtain the information from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, it would be difficult to get at this
rate for several reasons. First, Fannie Mae records by zip code, and Freddie Mac by census tract; neither
is an exact match with the service area. Second, since we only had origination information for roughly
one half of the foreclosed loans in the data base, it would be necessary to research the rest of these at the
Registry of Deeds. Third, we know that the Banker and Tradesman database search only turns up
foreclosures after mid-1989. Therefore, the ideal way to get at the foreclosure rate would be to use Fannie
and Freddie's foreclosure data and purchase data as the most accurate count of the two agencies' activity in
the service area. However, it was not possible to obtain this information from either agency, although it
was requested of both agencies.
14Here, I have used 114 rather than 123 as my base for the total number of properties, because information
on property use only appeared in the record for 114 properties.
15Barcan and Feloney, p.1.
16It should also be noted that the census data lumps together 3 and 4 family properties while the
foreclosure data considers 3-families alone, which means that triple deckers make up even less of the
housing stock than the 53.7% would indicate, and therefore are even more overrepresented in the
secondary market foreclosures than the above numbers show.
table should be read from left to right, as the percentages refer to the number of properties
in each ownership category as a percentage of the properties in each use category.
Table 2.1
Number of Units in Property by Ownership Status
Properties Foreclosed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Owner-Occ Undetermined Investor-Owned Likely Inv-Owned TOTALS
Single family 7 25% 17 60.7% 4 14.29% 0 0% 28
Two-family 1 7.14% 8 57.14% 4 28.57% 1 7.14% 14
Triple decker 10 13.7% 16 21.92% 43 58.9% 4 5.48% 73
TOTALS 18 41 51 5 115
Source: Compiled by author from Banker and Tradesman on-line database and telephone books.
The table shows that there were more investor-owned properties than any other category,
with triple-deckers falling most heavily into the investor-owned category. The table
demonstrates, then, that triple-deckers are by far the biggest part of the secondary market
foreclosure problem, and that absentee-owned properties make up the bulk of the
foreclosed triple-deckers.
Although it was not possible to obtain the data on mortgage origination for each property,
the data were available for roughly half of the foreclosures. The breakdown of mortgages
by years of origination was as follows:
Table 2.2
Number of Foreclosed Mortgages by Year of Origination
Properties Foreclosed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Year of pre-1987 or 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total
Origination unknown
Number of 54 16 18 19 13 1 0 0 121
Mortgages
Source: Compiled by Author from Banker and Tradesman on-line database
As the table shows, the bulk of the foreclosed mortgages were originated, and therefore
purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, during the mid and late 1980's.
Finally, the following table shows which companies wrote the original mortgages on the
foreclosed properties. Many of these banks and mortgage companies, including
Northeastern, Comfed, Merchants, University Bank and others have since failed. In other
cases, lenders were affiliates of each other. This was the case for University Bank, which
held both Northeastern and Sterling as subsidiaries that originated mortgages for the
bank.17
17Conversation with Ada Focer, March 8, 1994.
Table 2.3
Number of Mortgages Originated by Lender
Properties Foreclosed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Lender # of Loans Lender # of Loans
Made Made
Northeastern Mtg Co 10 Esplanade Mtg Co Inc 1
Comfed Savings Bank 7 First Eastern Mtg Co 1
Commonwealth Mtg 6 Keystone Mtg Corp 1
Sterling Mtg Co 4 Leader Mtg Co Inc 1
Other Private Lender 3 Lomas Mortgage 1
USAInc
Seller 3 Mass Coop Bk 1
Merchants Mtg Co 2 New Boston Mtg 1
Powder House Mtg Co 2 Norwest Mtg 1
Progressive Consumers 2 Peoples Fed Svgs Bk 1
Shawmut Mtg Co 2 Plymouth Mtg Co 1
Cap Mtg Co Inc 1 Premiere Fndg 1
Centrust Mtg Corp 1 Provident Fncl Svc 1
Dime Real Estate Svcs 1 University Bank 1
Source: Compiled by author from Banker and Tradesman on-line database.
Finally, since the time of foreclosure, 78 of the properties foreclosed upon by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac have been resold. Of these, at least 16, and probably numerous others1 8
have been purchased by realty trusts or other investors. Also, eight of the resold
properties have already been sold a second time, some within days or weeks of the original
purchase from Fannie Mae.
While the ownership status of foreclosed property owners helps to explain why some of
these homes were at higher risk for foreclosure, in some cases the instability in the
properties actually reaches farther back into the properties' history. The following title
searches illustrate a typical history on a foreclosed property in the Codman Square service
area:
18This number comes from a simple inspection of the Banker and Tradesman data to see which properties
were purchased either by realty trusts or by individuals buying multiple properties at auction. No
additional work was done to determine occupancy status of purchasers; it can be assumed, however, that at
least some of the other purchasers are also investors.
Title Search #1
107 Bloomfield Street - 3 units
June 7. 1993 -
April 22, 1993 -
May 18, 1990 -
October 3. 1985 -
March 12, 1985 -
March 12, 1985 -
September 24, 1984 -
October 1. 1980 -
May 10, 1978 -
April 21, 1977 -
March 26, 1976 -
Greenhays Realty Trust buys 107 Bloomfield Street from FNMA for
$36,900, with a mortgage from Gerald Issokson for $36,900
Anne Marie Brennan of Hyde Park, MA, foreclosed upon by Fannie Mae.
Anne Marie Brennan, then of 34 Whitfield Street, Dorchester, purchased
from Dominic Lombardo of 166 Orchard Street, Watertown. Paid
$210,000 with a $189,000 mortgage from Sterling Mortgage Company.
Dominic Lombardo purchased from Urban Homes, Inc. for $103,500.
Borrowed $98,300 from WST Mortgage Corporation. Mortgage was
adjustable, starting at 9.375%, with an annual change date on which 1.5%
could be added to the current index. On the same date, WST sold the
mortgage to Woonsocket Institute for Savings.
Jonathan Crutchley, as trustee of the 107 Bloomfield Street Realty Trust,
sold the property for $55,000 to Urban Homes, Inc., of 921 Washington
Street in Dorchester. Urban Homes obtained a $55,000 mortgage from
Meetinghouse Cooperative Bank.
Jonathan Crutchley, of 512 Gallivan Boulevard #218 and as trustee for 107
Bloomfield Street Realty Trust, bought from Deborah Steward for $1000
and an agreement to assume a mortgage to the Provident Institute for
Savings and water and sewer liens and property taxes.
Petition from the Lomas and Nettleton Company of Philadelphia to
foreclose on Deborah Stewart's mortgage.
Mortgage assigned to Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Petition from the Provident Institute for Savings to foreclose on Deborah
Stewart's mortgage.
Petition from the Provident Institute for Savings to foreclose on Deborah
Stewart's mortgage.
Deborah Stewart purchased from Frank X. Machnig for $20,500. Received
a mortgage from the Provident Institute for Savings for $19,850 at an
interest rate of 8 1/2 %, with payments of $152.65 per month.
Source: Compiled by author at Suffolk County Registry of Deeds.
Title Search #2
105 Erie Street
October 1. 1993 -
March 19, 1993 -
December 22, 1992 -
June 21, 1991 -
September 29, 1989 -
September 20, 1989 -
May 27, 1987 -
January 17, 1986 -
May 31, 1974 -
Rockcity Realty Trust purchased from Freddie Mac for $8000.
Edward Fopiano of Scituate, MA, foreclosed on by Freddie Mac.
Petition to foreclose on Edward Fopiano.
Assignment of mortgage from Northeastern to FHLMC.
Fopiano received mortgage for $140,000 from University Bank.
Edward Fopiano of 9 Torrey's Lane in Scituate, MA, purchased property for
$201,000 from Lynne K. Laneau and Gail Kanellos of Weymouth. Received
mortgage from sellers for $98,750 at 12%, payable in 30 days.
Lynne K. Laneau and Gail Kanellos of Weymouth bought from Enid M.
Nicholas and Myrna D. Dent of Hyde Park for $12,500.68.
Laneau, Kanellos, Nicholas and Dent paid $52,500 to James C. Green, Jr.,
trustee of James C. Green Realty Trust. Laneau and Kanellos took 1/3 shares
each and Nicholas and Dent took 1/6 shares each. Mortgage of $46,346 from
Northern Mortgage Company, Norwell, MA, at 11% or $441.68 per month.
James Green of 6 Harvard Park, Dorchester, bought from the Veterans'
Administration for $2500. Received a mortgage for $2,250 at 8 1/4%, paying
$19.19/month.
Source: Compiled by author at Suffolk County Registry of Deeds.
Beginning with the earliest pieces of data, the history of each of these properties is as
follows. In the case of 107 Bloomfield Street, Deborah Stewart originally purchased the
property from Frank Machnig for $20,500 in 1976. She received a mortgage from
Provident for $19,850, nearly 97% of the sales price. Starting just a year later, she had
problems paying her mortgage, as evidenced by the petitions to foreclose from 1977 through
1984. In 1985 what appears to be a pre-foreclosure sale took place, in which Jonathan
Crutchley, a local realtor in Dorchester, bought the property for $1000 plus mortgage, taxes
and water and sewer liens. On the very same day, Crutchley sold the house to Urban
Homes, Inc. for $55,000, probably a handsome profit given the small size of Deborah
Stewart's mortgage; Urban Homes obtained a 100% mortgage on the property. Barely six
months later, Urban Homes nearly doubled its investment by selling the property for
$103,500 to Dominic Lombardo, who received a mortgage for nearly 95% of the sales
price. Five years later, when the market had already started to turn down, Anne Marie
Brennan bought the property for $210,000, double what Lombardo had paid for it.
Although the property was clearly an investment, because she was listed on the deed at
another address, Sterling Bank gave her a mortgage for 90% of the sales price. Even
though at that time Fannie Mae required owners of triple deckers to put down no less than
30% equity, the GSE bought the mortgage anyway, foreclosing on the property three years
later. Since the foreclosure, the Greenhays Realty Trust has purchased the property for
$36,900, with a 100% mortgage.
For 105 Erie Street, which, has a sister property, 103 Erie, with exactly the same history,
the first piece of data shows that James Green bought the property from the Veterans'
Administration for just $2500 in 1974. He received a mortgage for 90% of the purchase
price. He held the property for twelve years and sold it to a group of four investors for
$52,500, or 21 times the price he paid for it, in 1986. The investors received a mortgage of
$46,346 on the property. Of these four investors, two of them, Lynne Laneau and Gail
Kanellos each held a one-third share in the property, and the other two, Enid Nicholas and
Myrna Dent, each held a one-sixth share. In May of 1987, Laneau and Kanellos bought the
other two out of their shares for $12,500.68 each. Then, a little over two years later, these
two owners sold the property to Edward Fopiano, an investor from Scituate, for the very
large price of $201,000, nearly four times what they had paid for it in 1986. The sellers
initially gave him a short-term mortgage for nearly half the sales price, but he then received a
mortgage for $140,000 from University Bank, who sold it to Freddie Mac two years later.
Freddie Mac foreclosed on Fopiano in 1993, selling the property to Rockcity Realty Trust
for just $8000 six months after the foreclosure.
What these two properties have in common is that the owners at the time of foreclosure
were absentee, but also that both properties had long histories of investment rather than
stable owner-occupancy. Both properties started out with an owner who purchased in the
mid-1970's and held for a long time but was bought out by a buyer who paid relatively little
and sold high. Both properties showed huge jumps in sales prices between the price paid by
the interim investor and the final investor who ultimately lost the property in foreclosure,
with the final prices so high as to seem implausible today. If these two examples are at all
typical of other small properties in Dorchester, then we can begin to understand why so
much of Dorchester's housing stock has been put at risk for foreclosure and destabilization.
Somerville - A Comparative Case
In order to understand more about what has happened in Dorchester, the Codman Square
NDC and the author chose to explore a comparative case for the city of Somerville. We
wanted to pick another area to study because we believe that the historic alteration in the
mortgage market, the 1980's upturn in the real estate market, and the recent real estate crash
have had a more severe effect on Dorchester than on other, more stable neighborhoods and
cities. We selected Somerville, a small city of 4.3 square miles and 76,210 residents19 just
north of Boston and east of Cambridge, for several reasons. First, Somerville has a similar
housing stock to Dorchester, with many two- and three-family properties. Second,
Somerville has a higher household income than Dorchester but is not a wealthy suburban
community. Finally, although Somerville has its share of investor-owned properties, it
generally has a higher rate of owner-occupancy than Dorchester.
In Somerville, we counted 1478 real estate transactions on 1-3 family properties between
June of 1989 and January of 1994. Of these, 139 were foreclosures. Thirty-six of the
foreclosures, or just over one quarter, were by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Of the
properties foreclosed by the two secondary market agencies, 13 were three-family houses,
14 had two units, and nine were single-family homes. For a database showing the history of
191990 Census.
transactions, names of owners, mortgage originators, and number of units, please turn to
Exhibit Six.
While it was not possible to verify how many of these properties were investor-owned as
compared to owner-occupied, some of the lenders turned out to be the same mortgage
originators as in the case of Dorchester. In fact, in the portfolio of loans foreclosed by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the three major players in the origination and sale of the loans
were also three of the major players in Dorchester. The top lender in these Somerville
properties was Comfed, which originated 5 of the 36 properties, followed by Northeastern
with 4 loans, and Sterling, which made 2 of the 36 mortgages.
At just under 9% of total real estate transactions, then, Somerville has a very low rate of
foreclosures as compared to the Codman Square service area, where foreclosures are nearly
one quarter of all transactions for the June 1989-January 1994 time period. 20 Interestingly,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac foreclosed upon roughly the same proportion of properties in
each of the two geographic areas, although the rate was a little bit lower for Somerville.
The two agencies were responsible for 25.8% of all foreclosures in Somerville and 29.7% of
all foreclosures in our part of Dorchester.
Although foreclosures have certainly been a problem in Somerville during the past five
years, the above numbers illustrate the fact that they have never reached the epidemic
proportions of foreclosures in Dorchester. Although it was beyond the scope of this thesis
to gather the data to support a full comparison between the two neighborhoods, I believe
20The foreclosure rate for Dorchester is slightly overcounted. This is because the foreclosure numbers are
precisely matched with the service area, which covers all of the 02124 zip code plus a little bit of 02121
and 02125. For the overall transactions, time did not permit such a precise count and therefore the overall
transactions are derived just from a search of the 02124 zip code. However, if there is an overcount, it is
likely to be by just a few percentage points, still leaving a large gap between the foreclosure rates in
Dorchester and in Somerville.
that the following characteristics helped to keep Somerville from suffering a level of
foreclosures comparable to Dorchester's. First, Somerville has a higher-rate of owner-
occupancy than Dorchester, supported by a much stronger local demand for
homeownership, both from natives of Somerville and from households that would choose to
live in Cambridge but cannot afford to do so. Next, incomes in Somerville are higher than
incomes in Dorchester, which also helps to strengthen demand for homeownership. Finally,
from an examination of the Banker and Tradesman data, Somerville does not appear to
have as much property-flipping and rapid turnover that Dorchester has had among its
foreclosed properties, suggesting a lower level of investment by landlords interested in quick
turnover and a more stable market.
Although it was not possible to gather all of the data for the Somerville case, it does begin
to suggest that Dorchester is different from some other neighborhoods that have a similar
housing stock and that experienced a boom-and-bust cycle over the last decade. The next
section will explore some of the reasons why Dorchester has suffered so many foreclosures,
and how those foreclosures relate to the secondary mortgage market.
Reasons For High Rate of Foreclosure in Dorchester
Why has Dorchester suffered such a high rate of foreclosure as compared to other
neighborhoods? The answers to this question can be explored in two ways: through data
analysis and through anecdotal evidence. Although this thesis set out to demonstrate
through the use of data how Dorchester has been treated differently and/or has responded
differently to conditions that exist far beyond its borders, it has not been possible to obtain
all of the data necessary to make this case. Therefore, the following section will explore the
questions around foreclosure in Dorchester using a combination of data and anecdotal
information.
The data that I have gathered for this thesis paints the following picture of the Codman
Square neighborhood's foreclosures: the foreclosed properties were largely investor-owned
and mainly triple deckers, with a concentration of original mortgages written by mortgage
companies and other lenders who are no longer in business. In addition, a large number of
these mortgages were purchased by Fannie Mae and/or Freddie Mac. Some of these
properties have long histories of flipping, absentee ownership and other signs of instability,
and some properties have already been resold to investors at very low prices.
There are several data-driven ways in which to actually prove that Dorchester was in fact
treated differently than Somerville and other communities by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
1. Default rate. First, I would ideally like to be able to compare the overall foreclosure
rates of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Dorchester against their foreclosure rates in
Somerville, to see whether more of their loans defaulted in Dorchester than in
Somerville. In order to make this comparison, I would need to know how many loans
each agency purchased, and how many of those loans went bad. The actual comparison
would be between data on loans purchased in a given year with the number of loans
originated in that year that went bad. However, it has not been possible to get the data
on total loans purchased within the Codman Square NDC's service area.21
2. Loan-to-value ratios. Next, as I will discuss in the section on anecdotal evidence, there
is reason to believe that at least some of the properties did not receive mortgages that
were appropriately priced for the risks that the properties represented to the holder of
the credit risk, i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. There are several issues related to
pricing:
First, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set guidelines that specify the loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios that they are willing to accept on the mortgages they buy, and those LTV's require
a higher downpayment for investor and multi-unit properties based on the higher risks
associated with those properties. Fannie Mae made a major change in its LTV standards
in September 1988. The before-and-after for fixed-rate mortgages looks like the
following:
Table 2.4
Fannie Mae Loan-to-Value Ratios
PRE-1988 Owner-Occ Inv-Owned POST-1988 Owner-Occ Inv-Owned
l's 95% 80% 95% 70%
2's 95% 80% 90% 70%
3's 95% 80% 80% 70%
4's 95% 80% 80% 70%
Source: Fannie Mae Selling Guidelines, Announcement 09/06/88; Conversation with Robert Engelstad, April 8, 1994.
21The most accurate data would actually be the numbers of defaults and the numbers of purchases as
compiled by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See discussion in footnote 13.
Since the majority of the loans in the sample were originated prior to 1988, it is likely
that many of the mortgages, especially on multi-unit properties, did not accurately reflect
the risk level of the borrowers and the loan amounts. The new underwriting standards
reflect an understanding that, in the words of Freddie Mac's Ann Schnare, "the best
predictor of default is equity."2 2 Too little equity in these properties may have
contributed to their likelihood of defaulting. It should be noted that although the sample
being discussed in this thesis is restricted to the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
foreclosures, the two agencies have such wide influence that their standards are likely to
be applied to loans that are sold to other investors besides the two government-
sponsored enterprises.
However, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac view their seller-servicer guidelines as standards
rather than ironclad rules, so an understanding of the guidelines alone does not allow the
researcher to assume that all loans will necessarily conform to the guidelines of the
period in which they were originated. In order to see what the actual loan-to-value
ratios were of the loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ultimately foreclosed upon, it
is necessary to view the original mortgage documents at the Registry of Deeds for each
of the properties in question. However, these documents are not reliable, because we
know that at least in some cases, the mortgage documents reflect fraudulent sales prices
and therefore it is impossible to determine the true loan-to-value ratios on those
mortgages.
3. Fraud. Even if we could be confident that the secondary mortgage market and mortgage
lenders knew how to calculate risk accurately when pricing mortgages, we cannot be
sure that loan documents are necessarily accurate representations of the transactions that
2 2Interview with Ann Schnare, Vice President of Housing Economics, and Andrea Stowers, Director of
Affordable Housing, at Freddie Mac, Maclean, Virginia, March 14, 1994.
took place. There are numerous ways in which fraud can enter into a property
transaction, but two major types affect loan-to-value ratios.
First, we know anecdotally that some investors passed themselves off as owner-
occupants in order to receive more favorable mortgage terms. As I will discuss in
Chapter 4, Bob Engelstad of Fannie Mae acknowledged that his agency became aware in
1991 that large numbers of 1-4 family properties classified as owner-occupied were in
fact investor-owned.23 If the mortgage originator and/or servicer does not make any
effort to confirm residences, or if one or both of those parties actually plays a role in the
misrepresentation, then it is fairly easy for an investor to pose as an owner-occupant.
Second, it was also common in Dorchester for buyers, sellers, real estate brokers and
sometimes mortgage originators to misrepresent the sales price of a given property.
According to Jonathan Crutchley, a real estate agent and property investor in Dorchester
for sixteen years, with both condominiums and 1-4 family properties, certain lenders
were almost certain to write mortgages on properties with fictional sales prices.
Crutchley explained that by the late 1980's, property values were so high that no
legitimate owner-occupant or investor could afford to purchase a small property. In
order to sell a property, a broker would have to find a buyer who generally had little or
no funds for a downpayment and would receive a 100% mortgage from the lender. In
order to qualify for the secondary markets' loan-to-value ratio guidelines, the parties
involved in the transaction would falsify the sales price to make it appear that the
mortgage represented a smaller proportion of the value than it actually did. Crutchley
believes that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the victims of these scams and were not
aware of the falsified documents until well after the loans began to go bad.
23Interview with Bob Engelstad, Senior Vice President of Mortgage and Lender Standards, Fannie Mae,
Washington, DC, March 14, 1994.
4. Drop in Property Values. Another factor in the Dorchester real estate market that is
often cited as a contributing factor to the high foreclosure rate is the rapid rise in values
during the 1980's, followed by a rapid fall in the late 1980's and early 1990's. For
example, the Case-Schiller index, which determines home prices using a repeat sales
index approach, notes that the values of single-family homes rose by 168.8% in the
Greater Boston area between 1982 and 1988/89, and fell 15.5% between 1988/89 and
1991.24 These indices do not include foreclosure sales. In another measure of property
values, median sales price, values of residential properties in the entire Dorchester
neighborhood plummeted from a median of $164,000 in 1989, to $120,000 in 1991, to
$89,000 in 1993.25
While declining property values certainly can be correlated with foreclosures, both
because a seller who loses equity through declining value may be more likely to default,
and because the recent real estate bust has also been accompanied by a recession that put
homeowners at higher risk of foreclosure due to job loss, the heavily speculative
activities and fraudulent real estate practices may also help to explain the extreme rise in
property values towards the late 1980's. Jonathan Crutchley argues, however, that
speculation fueled the rise in property values in the first place, pointing out that a few
speculative sales with false sales prices or other artificially high prices led to a rise in
prices for the entire market, since appraised values rose when sales prices rose. He
commented, "When I started in this business we had local banks and the banker could
look out his window and see the property. He knew what it was worth. These days it's
different.. .you had the rise of all these mortgage companies, and you had all these
24 Case Shiller Weiss, Inc., Home Price Bulletin, Case-Shiller Home Price Indexes for Massachusetts,
Fourth Quarter 1991. Cambridge, MA, Case Shiller Weiss, 1992.
2 5Banker and Tradesman, Annual Compreport, Suffolk County, 1993, Banker and Tradesman, Boston,
MA, 1994.
mortgage lenders that were salesmen paid on commission. And when they got hungry
they needed to come up with buyers and transactions." 26
Crutchley's analysis of how so many problem transactions slipped through the mortgage
lending system, in many cases to be purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, is a story
about how the mortgage market has changed in the past two decades. The move from a
local system to a national one, from a market controlled by local lenders with local
knowledge to one dominated by Wall Street and by a series of other players without an
understanding of local property markets, is a part of the explanation for the situation that we
see in Dorchester today. The next two chapters will outline these changes in the mortgage
market and offer some insight into how these changes affect neighborhoods such as
Dorchester.
Chapter Three will provide some background and history on the secondary mortgage
market. In Chapter Four, I will discuss the "unbundling" of the mortgage market and how
the large institutions that affect all cities, towns and neighborhoods where property is
bought and sold have changed over the past two decades. Finally, in the conclusion I will
talk about the special nature of the Dorchester real estate market as compared to other
markets such as Somerville, and offer a model for how these large, macro-level institutions
have such a negative effect on the micro-level of Dorchester's neighborhoods and houses.
26Interview with Jonathan Crutchley, April 13, 1994.
CHAPTER THREE
The History and Function of the Secondary Mortgage Market
Overview
In the United States, the housing finance system consists of two separate mortgage
markets, a primary market and a secondary market. In the primary market, borrowers
who want to buy residential property for occupancy or investment receive their funds from
a mortgage banker or savings institution. The secondary mortgage market is the capital
market system under which mortgages are bought and sold by savings and loans,
commercial banks, mortgage bankers and institutional investors. Upon their sale,
mortgages are either held in portfolio by the investor or securitized and sold to other
investors.
By providing a market for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, the secondary
market accomplishes two main goals. First, the market provides liquidity to mortgage
lenders. Second, by replacing local lenders as the sole providers of mortgage capital, the
secondary market assists in the geographic spread of mortgage capital around the nation.
The secondary market is dominated by three major players: Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), and Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are both federally chartered private corporations, also known as government-
sponsored enterprises (GSE's), and Ginnie Mae is a government-owned corporation under
the auspices of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Although
there are increasing numbers of private corporations that compete with these agencies for
market share, the bulk of the mortgages sold on the secondary market are purchased by
one of these three agencies. For a chart demonstrating the role of the secondary market,
please see Exhibit Seven.
Fannie Mae was the original secondary market agency, chartered as a government
corporation under the National Housing Act of 1938. The agency was chartered to
provide an investment market for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing
Administration and Veterans' Administration, most of which were originated by mortgage
bankers as opposed to depository institutions. Since 1972, when the federal government
decided that it wanted to create a market for conventional mortgages and gave Fannie
Mae the authority to purchase them, Fannie Mae has bought from savings institutions as
well. Around half of Fannie Mae's annual purchases, financed either from equity or from
bond issues, are for its own portfolio. The other half are in mortgage-backed securities.
In 1968, when the federal government converted Fannie Mae into a private corporation, it
created Ginnie Mae to fulfill some of the special functions that Fannie Mae could no
longer fill. Ginnie Mae does not purchase mortgages, but guarantees mortgages insured
by FHA and VA, and converts them into "pass through" securities. These securities are
backed by a pool of mortgages, and interest and principle payments are literally passed
through to the investors. Because Ginnie Mae is actually an arm of the federal
government, and therefore the agency's securities are backed by the "full faith and credit"
of the U.S. government, these securities are especially desirable to investors.
The third major secondary market agency, Freddie Mac, is also a privately-held, publicly
chartered corporation. Created under the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, the
agency's mission was originally to provide a secondary market for mortgages originated by
savings and loan institutions. Unlike Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac does not purchase
mortgages for its own portfolio but rather securitizes all of its purchases.
Although Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's government sponsorship does not actually include
government backing of their securities, the corporations are entitled to borrow from the
U.S. Treasury. The companies enjoy other privileges as well, including exemption from
state and local income taxes on their earnings and exemption from registering their securities
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). According to the Wall Street
Journal, "[t]he Treasury estimates these exemptions are worth $2 billion to $4 billion
annually--benefits also shared by shareholders and by homebuyers." 27 The corporations'
close relationship with the federal government arguably leads to a perception in the capital
markets that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities and debt instruments are safer
investments than other issuers of similar securities, and therefore gives them a competitive
edge over other players in the marketplace. 28
Products
The investment products bought and sold by the secondary markets take a variety of
forms:
. Whole Loans. A whole loan sale involves the transfer from a bank to an investor or to
the secondary market of 100 percent of a loan or a pool of loans that are unsecured.
Fannie Mae also sells some whole loans. Prior to the development of the secondary
mortgage market and the security and bond instruments developed by the market,
whole loans were the only way to invest in mortgages. They are considered an
imperfect investment because they involve lengthy documentation processes when all
the loan documents are transferred to an investor, because they are unsecured by
27 Kenneth Bacon, "Attempt at Tighter Regulation, Lobbying Softens Bill Pushed by Critics Who Assail
Implied U.S. Guarantee: Do Taxpayers Face Exposure?", Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1992, Sec. A, p.
1+.
2 8United States Treasury Department, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on Government Sponsored
Enterprises, May 1990, pp. A-15-A-16.
government backing, and because each loan's unique nature makes it hard to evaluate
the quality of the investment.29
. Participation Sales. In a participation, an investor or the secondary market buys a
share in a mortgage or a pool of mortgages, but the originating lender retains an
ownership interest in the mortgage or mortgages being sold. Typically the investor
will assume anywhere from a 50% to a 90% share, but the key difference between a
whole loan and a participation is that with a participation the originating lender retains
the fiduciary responsibility for the loan rather than passing it on to the investor.30
. Mortgage-Backed Securities. A mortgage-backed security (MBS) is formed when a
group of mortgages with similar interest rates and sizes are pooled. Much of Fannie
Mae's and Freddie Mac's business is made up of the MBS that each company creates.
An investor who purchases an MBS receives an interest in the mortgage pool and
receives monthly interest and principle payments from the security. MBS's are made
more attractive to investors because they usually carry some sort of credit
enhancement such as pool insurance or private insurance. 31 Also, while loans are often
pooled according to common characteristics such as principal amount and interest
rate, an MBS is considered a less risky way to invest than a whole loan, because the
291n his book Liar's Poker, Michael Lewis talks about the investment banking house Salomon Brothers'
entry into the whole loan sales market. Lewis notes that because of the huge volume of whole loans
flooding the market, and because Salomon Brothers stood to make a great deal of money as the only
investment banking house prepared to participate in the mortgage market, the firm's traders did not check
on each of the loans they bought, assuming that their profits would be so large as to offset any bad loans
that might slip through. Although they turned out to be correct about the profits, this eagerness to
purchase loans without taking the time to evaluate them perhaps set a precedent in the secondary
mortgage market. Because the thrifts whose loans they were then had Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
guarantee them, it was possible to then sell the loans to Salomon Brothers' clients, who could buy the
loans confidently knowing that either a GSE or a thrift held the credit risk on the loan. Michael Lewis,
Liar's Poker: Rising Through the Wreckage on Wall Street, New York, Penguin Books, 1989, p. 107.
30Dall Bennewitz, Introduction to the Secondary Mortgage Market: A Step Beyond, U.S. League of
Savings Institutions, 1989, pp. 24-25; Lynn S. Powell, Secondary Mortgage Market Basics, Washington,
DC, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, 1990, p. 7.
3 1Bennewitz, pp. 31-32; Powell, p.7.
loans in the pools are usually diversified in terms of geography, borrower credit
histories and quality of real estate collateral. 32 Finally, mortgage-backed securities can
take a wide variety of forms, but they are all based on the principle of diversifying risk
through pooling loans.
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, the role of the secondary mortgage market
increased dramatically, and the role of Wall Street investment bankers especially
influenced that growth. In order to understand how the secondary mortgage market grew
to its current proportions, it is important to understand the crisis during this time period
that befell the savings and loan institutions, which since the Depression era had dominated
the primary mortgage market.
Relationship with Thrift Institutions
Chartered in 1936, the savings and loan institutions, or thrifts, were founded to
"encourage family thrift and home ownership." The business of the thrifts has traditionally
followed this dual mission; they take in deposits in the form of savings accounts and lend
out money in the form of mortgages. The problem with this combination of activities is
that savings accounts, which historically made up the bulk of the thrifts' liabilities, have a
fixed interest rate for the depositor, traditionally around 6%, but no fixed date of maturity,
because the depositor can remove all or part of the money from a savings account at will.
At the same time, most of the thrifts' assets were in mortgages, which are long-term and
have fixed dates of maturity.
Thrifts traditionally profited by loaning mortgage money at a higher rate than they paid out
to depositors. However, if short-term interest rates rise quickly, as they did in 1979, this
scheme fails, because the thrifts have to borrow money at a higher interest rate than they
32Powell, p. 29.
can lend it. To make matters worse, the long maturity time of mortgages means that even
if long-term rates rise, most of the thrifts' assets continue to be in their older, lower-yield
mortgages. When Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker wanted to slow inflation in
1979, then, he simply hiked interest rates, which made the thrifts stop lending and resulted
in the desired effect of slowing the economy but also caused the failure of nearly a quarter
of the nation's savings and loans. 33 In addition, the thrifts faced the loss of many
depositors from disintermediation, which happens when customers remove their savings
from depository institutions because it is more profitable to invest elsewhere.
Depository institutions like S & Ls and commercial banks are known as financial
intermediaries, because they take their depositors' money and invest it in securities like
bonds, stocks or mortgages. For the depositor, the guaranteed interest rate and
convenience of a savings account has traditionally made that an appealing way to save
money. However, when interest rates spike as in 1979, consumers take their money and
invest it in money markets, because primary investment becomes a much more lucrative
way to earn interest than a savings account would be. The S & L's were further restricted
from raising their interest rates to compete with the money markets by Regulation Q, part
of the Banking Act of 1933.34
33Lewis, p. 100.
34L. Ritter and W. Silber, Principles of Money, Banking and Financial Markets, New York, Basic Books,
1991, pp. 95-96. Ultimately, the Reagan administration's 1981 deregulation of the thrifts and other
banking institutions phased out these interest rate restrictions as well as restrictions on NOW and money
market accounts which the thrifts argued they needed to be able to offer in order to retain their customers.
Growth
This precarious situation meant that in the early 1980's, America's thrift institutions were
badly in need of cash. The combination of high interest rates and decreased deposits made
the S & L's highly illiquid. In the late 1970's, Wall Street had just begun to get into the
business of trading mortgages in the form of mortgage bonds, but the standstill in the
mortgage lending business brought Wall Street's new product to a halt. When Congress
passed a law in 1981 allowing a substantial tax break for thrifts who sold their mortgages
and took losses, thrifts turned to Wall Street for liquidity and began to buy and sell
mortgage loans in huge volume. In addition, the Wall Street firm of Salomon Brothers,
which pioneered the secondary mortgage market, began to convince its clients that
mortgages were a good investment, thereby creating a market for their mortgage
products.
By creating a strong investment market for mortgages, Wall Street effectively restructured
the American mortgage market. The following table illustrates the growth in the
secondary mortgage market as a result of the rapid increase in sales volumes:
Table 3.1
Total Residential Mortgage Obligations, Originations and Secondary Market Activity
(Billions of Dollars)
Total Residential FNMA + FHLMC + GNMA
Year Outstanding New Debt Outstanding % of Resi- Purchases
Debt I (Originations) I dential Debt
1970 324.4 44.4 16.4 5.1% 5.9
1975 541.0 88.6 56.8 10.5% 13.2
1980 1011.6 146.3 173.2 17.1% 32.0
1985 1517.4 280.6 479.2 31.6% 135.1
1989 2420.7 388.9 991.8 41.0% 228.4
Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on Government Sponsored Enterprises, p. B-18.
Note: This data lumps together single-family (1-4 units) with multifamily (5+ units) mortgages.
As the table illustrates, the amount of money in mortgages overall skyrocketed during the
1970's and 1980's. Outstanding debt increased from $324.4 billion in 1970 to $2420.7
billion in 1989, an increase of more than 700%. Secondary market activity also exploded.
The share of residential debt bought by the three government-sponsored enterprises went
from just over 5% of outstanding mortgages in 1970 to more than 40% of them in 1989. In
addition, if growth can be measured by the amount of money spent on mortgage purchases,
the three enterprises spent barely $6 billion in 1970 as compared to nearly $230 billion in
1989. Finally, outstanding mortgage purchases rose from $173 billion in 1980 to nearly $1
trillion by 1989.
In addition to boasting high volume, the two corporations have also generated tremendous
profits. In 1991, Fannie Mae's earnings reached $1.36 billion while Freddie Mac's were at
$555 million, and according to the Wall Street Journal, the companies' returns on equity are
"two or three times the average for financial firms." Finally, as of 1992, the price for a share
of Fannie Mae stock was $57.625, as compared to $2.375 just ten years earlier.35
The growth and profitability of these two agencies also translates into power both in the
marketplace and in the political arena. For example, although it may be argued that
Salomon Brothers was instrumental in launching the explosive growth of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac during the early and mid-1980's, Salomon Brothers' plays a greatly
diminished role in the mortgage markets today. According to the Wall Street Journal,
Fannie Mae cut much of its business with Salomon Brothers in 1987 following Salomon's
failed attempt to keep Fannie Mae from trading in Real Estate Mortgage Investment
Conduits (REMICS), a highly profitable mortgage-backed security that Salomon Brothers
had helped to invent. In addition, the government sponsored enterprises' power on
Capitol Hill is legendary; as quasi-public corporations they enjoy the benefit of being an
35Bacon, "Attempt at Tighter Regulation..." pp. 1+.
inside player at the same time that they can lobby and distribute political action committee
(PAC) money like other private corporations. 36
Regulation
Because of their peculiar status as quasi-public agencies, the regulation of the
government-sponsored enterprises has been a subject of much debate. Currently, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has general regulatory powers
over both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with the Secretary of the Treasury having
approval power over the issuance of securities. While HUD has overseen Fannie Mae
since its establishment as a privately-owned, publicly-chartered corporation, the agency
only assumed these powers over Freddie Mac in 1989 following the passage of FIRREA.
Previously, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, abolished by FIRREA, regulated Freddie
Mac. Most of HUD's regulatory powers are related to the GSEs' financial soundness and
to the issuance of new stocks and bonds. In addition, HUD was traditionally supposed to
require that "a reasonable portion of mortgage purchases be related to the national goal of
providing adequate housing for low-and moderate-income families, ,but with reasonable
economic returns to [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac]." 37
In 1992, the United States Congress increased HUD's regulatory powers over Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac when it passed the Government Sponsored Enterprises Regulatory Reform
Act. The legislation's provisions included stricter minimum capital standards to protect
against capital risk and interest rate risk.38 In addition, the bill also strengthened affordable
housing requirements with its so-called "30-30" provision. This requires that 30% of Fannie
36Bacon, "Attempt at Tighter Regulation..." pp. 1+.
37U.S. Treasury Department, pp. A-13; B-12.
38
"Capital risk" and "interest rate risk" are the two major types of risk that lenders and investors face.
Capital risk is the risk of a given asset's failure, such as a mortgage default, in which the investor loses his
or her capital. Interest rate risk is the risk of swings in interest rates, which lowers profits to investors or
can even make an investor lose money.
Mae and Freddie Mac's purchases be loans made on properties in inner-city neighborhoods,
and 30% be loans made on properties purchased by low-and moderate-income people; the
two pools are allowed to overlap. 39 In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will be
providing Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)-type data on loan purchases to HUD
for a public-access database, although the exact content of the database is still being
negotiated among HUD and the GSE's.
The tremendous growth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has also led to greater standardization in
the mortgage market. Both agencies provide their seller-servicers with a set of written guidelines
for their relationships, covering such issues as underwriting, quality control and how to handle
mortgage defaults. While both of the GSE's stress that these are to be treated as guidelines rather
than as formal requirements, it is clear to most mortgage lenders that Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac set the standards for how to underwrite mortgages and which mortgages to make.
Furthermore, because they know that the GSE's purchase such a large percentage of the country's
mortgages, lenders have increasingly conformed their loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
standards. The relationship between lenders and the secondary markets will be explored further in
the following chapter.
39Kenneth H. Bacon, "Senate Bill Setting New Requirements on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac is Passed,"
Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1992, Sec. C, pp. 19+.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Unbundling of the Mortgage Market and its Effect on Mortgage Lending
As described in the preceding chapter, the hyper-development of the secondary mortgage market
during the 1980's helped to bring about major changes in the mortgage lending industry.
Economist Robert Van Order of Freddie Mac has described these changes as a process of
"unbundling" the major functions of the mortgage lending process,40 and his observations are
echoed by lenders and other participants in the mortgage lending business. In essence, the four
major functions of the mortgage market: origination, servicing, credit risk and investment, all of
which prior to the 1980's tended to be held by a single entity, are now usually split between a
variety of different players. This complete separation of roles and responsibilities has led to
increased room for abuse within the mortgage lending system even as it has helped to create a
mortgage market that runs with increased efficiency. This chapter will describe in detail the four
major areas of involvement within the mortgage market, with a focus on the wide variety of
individual players involved in a mortgage over its life.
Origination
The first step in a mortgage is origination. Origination is the process in which the borrower
actually gets his or her loan in the primary mortgage market. There are two major categories of
mortgage originators, depository institutions and non-depository institutions. In general,
depository institutions can sell directly to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Non-depository
institutions, many of which are mortgage companies, cannot sell directly to the secondary markets
in most cases and are often known as "third party originators" because they sell their loans to
banks, which then sell them to the secondary markets. A borrower may be prequalified and
40Van Order, Robert, Unpublished paper titled "Secondary Mortgage Markets in the United States: Their
Evolution and Some Management Issues," November 1993, p. 1
referred to an originator by a real estate broker, or the borrower may shop around and find a
mortgage originator on his or her own.
Real Estate Brokers. Whether or not the borrower is actually referred to a mortgage originator
by a real estate broker, the realtor is usually a buyer's first stop on the trip to purchasing a house.
Real estate brokerage is a fee-driven business. For their livelihood, brokers depend upon the fees
that they charge to sellers, and sometimes to purchasers, in the case of buyer-brokers, of the
properties that they list. Once a property is sold, the broker moves on to the next one. His or her
main concern about completed deals is that they may lead to word-of-mouth referrals if the client
is pleased with the broker's ability to move a piece of property. The broker's lack of involvement
over the life of a mortgage loan may make some brokers vulnerable to the temptation of providing
questionable information on borrowers.
In one example, Fannie Mae Vice President of Mortgage Lenders and Credit Standards Bob
Englestad described a meeting that he had held with a group of real estate brokers from Boston in
1991. When one of the brokers mentioned the group's concern about the large number of
investor-owners whose 1-4 family properties had been foreclosed upon, Englestad pointed out
that Fannie Mae's records showed that investor-owners of 1-4 family housing in Massachusetts
actually had lower default and delinquency rates than did owner-occupants of similar housing (see
chart below).41 Engelstad says that the brokers laughed and said, "'Do you mean that you actually
4 1Serious Delinquency Rates (90+ Day and in Foreclosure)
Fannie Mae, 1991
# of Units Investor & Owner-Occupied Owner-Occupied
Massachusetts U.S. Massachusetts U.S.
One 1.14 .64 1.13 .64
Two 2.22 1.81 2.26 1.21
Three 5.19 2.19 5.28 2.29
Four 5.78 1.61 7.06 1.81
Source: Federal National Mortgage Association.
Note: This chart suggests that owner-occupied mortgages had a higher rate of foreclosure than investor-owned mortgages; these are the
numbers that the real estate brokers were disputing when they alleged that there had been fraud.
believed that those loans were all owner-occupied loans?'" At that point, Engelstad realized that
the buyers had misrepresented their occupancy status, with the full knowledge of the brokers,
who ultimately passed that false information on to the secondary markets and investors once the
loans were sold.
Categories of Mortgage Originators. In Massachusetts, as described above, both depository
institutions and non-depository institutions may originate mortgages. Although there is a
spectrum of institutions within these categories that make mortgage loans, for the purposes of this
thesis I will focus mainly on the contrast between full depository institutions, which are traditional
mortgage lenders, and mortgage brokers. During this discussion I will use the term "banks" to
refer to depository institutions and "mortgage companies" or "third-party originators" to refer to
mortgage brokers. Depository institutions may either sell loans to the secondary markets or hold
them in their own portfolio, while mortgage companies must sell all of their loans to investors or
to other banks who then sell them to the secondary markets. Until January 1, 1992, only
depository institutions were subject to regulation in Massachusetts, but as a result of abuses
documented by Attorney General Scott Harshbarger and others during investigations the second
mortgage scam, other types of mortgage originators have also become subject to the state's
regulatory power.
According to Steve Sousa, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Mortgage Bankers'
Association, the numbers of players in the mortgage market has shifted dramatically since the mid-
1980's. Sousa believes that the number of banks originating mortgages was at its peak in the
years 1986 through 1988, prior to the wave of bank failures and consolidations that has taken
place since 1989. At that time, according to Sousa, the third-party origination business was just
beginning to grow in Massachusetts.
Sousa estimates that during the mid-1980's, banks held around 40% of the mortgage origination
business, with mortgage brokers holding 30% and other institutions holding the rest. Since that
time, the market shares have shifted. The banks' share has shrunk to 30% or so, with mortgage
brokers picking up the banks' share. In addition to obtaining a larger portion of the market share,
Sousa believes that the actual number of mortgage companies has grown in Massachusetts during
the early 1990's, with many of them active in the refinance business since interest rates dropped in
1991. In 1993, under the new regulatory legislation, there were 2000 licensed lenders of various
kinds in Massachusetts, with 1530 banks and 300 licensed mortgage brokers. 42
Other Players in the Origination Process. Regardless of the type of organization that originates
the mortgage, there are several other players who will likely have a role in collecting, verifying
and providing the information necessary to decide whether the borrower should receive a
mortgage, for what amount and under what terms. First, the originator will use the services of an
appraiser, either from its own staff or on a contract basis. The appraiser's job is to determine the
value of the property. He or she performs this task by inspecting the property, taking
photographs of it from all three sides and providing comparative sales prices for recent local sales.
Appraisals are another area with potential for error and abuse.
Jeff Beck, an assistant vice president of commercial lending at Hibernia Savings Bank in Quincy,
worked as an appraiser during the 1980's. He noted that the attitude of some mortgage
originators was: "Don't tell us the value (of the property); we'll tell you the value." He described
one occasion on which he had appraised a property and taken pictures that showed iron anti-theft
bars covering the left-side first floor windows. When he brought the pictures to the mortgage
company that was writing a loan for the property, he was asked to "'retake the left side picture
from another angle that wouldn't show the bars.' These kinds of things happened all the time,"
42Interview with Steve Sousa, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Mortgage Bankers' Association,
March 18, 1994.
says Beck. "If you wanted their business, you had to do it their way." Beck says he decided he
didn't want the work badly enough to behave dishonestly, and gave up working for that particular
mortgage company. 43
Another player in the mortgage origination process is the title attorney. The title attorney's job is
to research the history of transactions on the property in order to ensure that no individual other
than the property's seller can claim to own the property. Because the title attorney, his or her
staff or subcontractor sees all of the prior sales on the property, he or she is in an ideal position to
identify land flips or other signs of false value in a property. However, the full history is usually
not provided in the loan documentation; both Bob Englestad at Fannie Mae and Andrea Stowers
at Freddie Mac report that whether full title history is actually part of the loan documentation is
up to the individual loan seller. A certification of title is usually considered sufficient evidence
that title is clear. Thus, although title searches are a required part of any mortgage origination
process, the actual information generated by the title search is likely to be seen by nobody
involved in the mortgage process except the title attorney.
In addition to title and appraisals, there is a standard set of information that a borrower is
generally required to provide in order to obtain a mortgage. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
provide the identical application form to their sellers. Required information includes: value of
property, type of residence (primary, vacation home, investment), borrowers' employment and
salary history and verification, borrowers' assets and liabilities, and details of the property
transaction. For investment properties, the secondary markets also require comparable rent
schedules. Fannie Mae has also recently begun to require that borrowers provide information on
whether they own other properties; the corporation will not purchase loans on 1-4 unit buildings
made to borrowers who own more than four properties.
4 3Interview with Jeff Beck, Assistant Vice President of Commercial Lending, Roger Meade, Vice
President of Mortgage Lending, and Robert Pyne, Assistant Vice President of Servicing, Hibernia Bank,
Quincy, MA, March 10, 1994.
Underwriting. The next step of the mortgage origination process is underwriting, in which the
information provided in the loan documentation is analyzed and verified. Lenders need to verify
sources of downpayment funds, confirm employment, analyze the borrower's credit history and
calculate debt-to-income ratios. If the loan has been originated by a mortgage banker or
mortgage lender, the underwriting will take place in the same institution. If, however, the loan is
originated by a mortgage broker and then sold to a lender or banker, the underwriting process
becomes crucial if the new institution is concerned about quality of the loans that it buys and sells.
While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provide guidelines for what is acceptable and what is not
acceptable, there is much room for lenders to make their own judgments and allow exceptions.
Roger Meade, the vice-president of mortgage lending for Hibernia Savings Bank in Quincy, says
that he has learned to be very scrupulous about underwriting the loans that his bank purchases
from originators. Says Meade, "I've got underwriters working for me and my job is to rip the
pieces out of them. I tell my underwriters to tear every one of those loans apart and put them
back together so at least they understand them." Meade says he is aware that originators have a
different set of motivations than bankers like himself. First, he points out, originators have to be
concerned about their volume, because they generally work on commission, unlike bankers who
collect a salary even on a slow week. Secondly, he believes that originators are not likely to have
any allegiance to the company for whom they work. He recalls that during the mid and late
1980's, when there was a great deal of activity in the mortgage market, originators who were
working for him would routinely quit without giving him notice if another lender or banker
offered the originator more money for his or her loans.44
Jeff Beck of Hibernia points out that while banks like his have survived in part because of their
prudent underwriting, that was not the case for many lenders in the late 1980's. Says Beck:
44Meade, March 10, 1994.
You could close a mortgage and get 50 basis points for your fee- on a $200,000 mortgage
that would be $1000. Then, you could sell and get your principle back on the spot plus a
point or more in profit, plus fees. By the time you were done you could have made $6-
10,000 from that one loan. You're not going to let a little underwriting stand in the way
of making so much profit! The loan is just a vehicle to get profit in your pocket. You
don't care about the buyer, or the tenants, or the people who live there. 45
The ability, then, to make profit on a loan on the front end, without needing to be involved with
the loan over the long term, allowed those originators who so chose to ignore questions about the
ability of a given loan to perform over the long term. While Hibernia's close attention to
underwriting has helped them to avoid taking on many bad loans, other lenders have not been so
lucky. According to Ann Schnare, Vice President of Housing Economics at Freddie Mac, her
company has seen a noticeably higher default rate among loans originated by mortgage brokers
than among loans originated by bank.
The fact that a large number of loans sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each year are not
actually originated by the institutions that sell them, then, raises questions about the secondary
markets' ability to control for quality or to force their sellers to control for quality in the loans
originated by mortgage brokers. Both companies require their sellers to run quality control
processes to check samples of the loans they purchase and sell, and Freddie Mac actually
maintains a blacklist of individuals with whom it refuses to do business either directly or as
principals of the company's seller-servicers. Fannie Mae, however, neither maintains such a list
nor makes any specific proscriptions about its sellers' relationships with third-party originators,
saying that those relationships are between the sellers and their originators. If in fact it is third-
party origination that is one predictive factor for delinquency and foreclosure, this loose policy
may offer loopholes for questionable loans to slip through.
45Beck, March 10, 1994.
Servicing
Once the loan is underwritten and approved, it can then be packaged for sale to Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac or one of their competitors. At that point, the institution selling the loan has the
choice of whether to sell the loan "servicing retained" or "servicing released." If the seller retains
servicing on a given loan, then that organization will collect payments from the borrower, remit
payments to the secondary market purchaser, and will be responsible for handling any
delinquencies or other problems that may arise. A lender that sells a loan with servicing released
will contract with another company, often in another part of the country from both the lender and
the loan, to collect payments, remit payments and handle questions, delinquencies and defaults.
Thus, not only is the servicing of the loan increasingly likely to be separate from the actual credit
risk associated with ownership of the loan, but it is also likely to be a function that is separate
from both origination and sale of the loan.
There are a variety of opinions on whether retention vs. release of servicing is a good predictor of
a loan's likelihood of default. The highly automated and technology-based nature of loan
servicing over the past few years has helped to bring down the costs of mortgages; as Freddie
Mac's Ann Schnare points out, the spread between the cost of capital and the actual cost of a
mortgage has become increasingly narrow in the past few years. 46 However, there is the question
of whether highly automated servicing firms, which are often based in locations remote from the
loans they are servicing, have the capability to help individual borrowers work out problems with
their mortgages, or even to identify those problems before they become severe. While neither
Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac has reported higher delinquency rates for sellers who release
servicing, Freddie Mac's Director of Affordable Housing, Andrea Stowers, believes that "(t)he
servicing industry is not very well-developed. Servicing systems on the single-family side are not
46Schnare, March 14, 1994.
set up to deal with problems. They are just set up to spit out a notice at 15 days and 30 days, not
to pick up a phone."47
The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guidelines confirm that the secondary markets do not expect
the servicer to simply terminate delinquent mortgages. Both sets of guidelines for servicers offer
workout options that include temporary indulgences, refinancing, and preforeclosure sales. The
secondary markets also provide guidelines for how to contact a borrower that is in default, with
the expectation that the servicer will contact the borrower first by letter, then by telephone, and
finally in person. However, because these are guidelines rather than rules, the servicer can really
decide for itself how to handle a delinquent loan. The easiest option may simply be to foreclose,
since it is the secondary markets and not the servicer who will take the loss.
The bankers at Hibernia Savings Bank believe that their own ability to avoid problems with
delinquencies and foreclosures has been strongly linked to their own choice to retain servicing on
all of their loans, both those that they keep in portfolio and those that they sell on the secondary
markets. The bank has even sued other lenders in order to take over the servicing on loans that
the other lenders have sold to Hibernia, because in their experience "they handle their own money
better than they handle ours." 48
At Hibernia, Robert Pyre is the assistant vice president for loan servicing. He has serviced loans
at Hibernia or other banks for 19 years. Hibernia's delinquency rate on the loans that it has sold
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is currently zero. Pyre and his colleagues attribute their success
to several factors related to the bank's retention of servicing. First, both Beck and Meade agree
that Pyre is an expert at servicing loans, saying that "Bobby knows that loans are going to be
47Schnare, March 14, 1994.
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delinquent before they are." 49 Pyre's experience has taught him how to look for indications that a
borrower may become delinquent so that he can take care of the problem early on.
Secondly, Roger Meade believes that Pyre's presence at the bank helps to keep him scrupulous
when he approves loans, saying that "(i)f I make a crummy loan, Bobby will come to my office." 50
For Hibernia Savings Bank, then, having the servicer right there in the office makes a difference in
the actual quality of the loans that are made and sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Finally, Pyre believes that most servicers, particularly servicers that do not play a role in other
aspects of the mortgage business, do not take full advantage of the fairly loose guidelines
provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He attributes his success at preventing delinquency to
his willingness to make personal contacts with delinquent borrowers and to offer them the range
of workout solutions that the secondary markets allow.
Credit Risk
After a loan is sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, these two agencies usually assume the credit
risk, should the borrower default. This is a change since 1989; before that time, the credit risk
sometimes stayed with the lender. Although the secondary markets' contracts with their seller-
servicers include an automatic buyback provision, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can only require a
seller to repurchase a loan if it can be proven that the loan was fraudulently or negligently
underwritten. Fannie Mae's Bob Englestad estimates that around 90% of loan defaults have no
problems in their underwriting and have gone bad for other reasons. While 90% may sound like a
healthy majority, this means that fully 10% of the loans that the corporation has foreclosed on
have had problems in their underwriting. Taken one step further, this means that in 10% of the
cases where loans have gone bad, a lender was either negligent or committed fraud. Finally, if the
49Meade, March 10, 1994.
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number is 10% across all foreclosed loans, the number could be much higher in particular
neighborhoods that have suffered heavy foreclosure losses, such as Dorchester.
Because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac need to rely on the honesty and capability of so many
different players to ensure the quality and long-term performance of the loans that they purchase,
the GSE's have developed quality control systems to evaluate both loans and sellers and have also
developed quality control requirements that they expect their lenders to follow on the loans that
they buy and sell. Although Bob Engelstad states that Fannie Mae has not made many changes to
its quality control processes, the bankers, trade association and secondary market employees
interviewed for this thesis agree that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have tightened their quality
control processes following the wave of delinquencies and foreclosures in the late 1980's and early
1990's.
Fannie Mae enforces its underwriting standards in several ways, according to Bob Englestad.
First, the agency is "cautious about who we buy from."51 This caution may be a reaction to some
of the defaults that Fannie Mae suffered on loans that the corporation bought in the late 1980's.
Both Steve Sousa and the bankers at Hibernia agree that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased
loans from sellers, particularly loans originated by mortgage companies, with whom they would
almost certainly not work today.
Second, Fannie Mae conducts underwriting reviews. Some reviews are conducted on a
discretionary basis while other loans are chosen at random for review. The agency reviews
around 4-5% of all of the loans that it purchases at random, while it selects its discretionary loans
based upon the lender, the mortgage product or the market. Englestad says that usually his staff
selects discretionary loans based upon the lender, particularly if Fannie Mae has observed that the
lender has a history of delinquent loans or other problems. In addition, the agency checks the
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underwriting for all problem loans. There are three points at which Fannie Mae's underwriters
will check to understand how a problem loan was underwritten: the first check will take place 30-
60 days after the purchase of the loan if the borrower is late, the second during the first six
months if there is an "early payment default" and the third takes place at foreclosure. All defaults
and foreclosures have their underwriting examined by Fannie Mae, unless there is a job loss,
illness or other obvious explanation for the borrower to default. These checks on foreclosed
loans have not always been part of Fannie Mae's practice; the corporation began checking all
foreclosed loans in 1985 and has started examining early payment defaults just within the last two
or three years.
In addition, Fannie Mae audits its sellers and servicers as institutions. There are three types of
audits. First, Fannie Mae may conduct reviews of the lender's administration on either a random
or discretionary basis. Second, the corporation has a home office audit team, which operates
mainly on a discretionary and occasionally on a random basis. Third, Fannie Mae sometimes
reviews loan origination practices on a discretionary basis. When Fannie Mae conducts on-site
operational reviews of its lenders, it examines all of the seller's practices with regard to
origination, quality control, servicing and its other activities. Englestad notes that in keeping with
the spirit of the guidelines, they do not look for the seller-servicers to follow specific rules so
much as they look at how they follow the practices that they have set out for themselves. For
example, since some institutions do all their origination in-house while others wholesale their
origination, Fannie Mae does not judge an individual seller-servicer by its type of origination but
rather how the institution controls for quality. Typically, on-site auditors will also ask to see the
institution's quality control system, to examine some loans that have come through the system,
and to understand what steps the institution has taken to remedy errors or problems that show up
during quality control.
Other information that Fannie Mae seeks in a review of an institution includes, for a random
sample of the random portion of the loans reviewed, reverification of all credit information
provided by the loan's seller. In the case of discretionary loans, the initial or "desk" review will
determine how often the agency will go beyond checking that required information exists in the
loan's file. In cases that have missing or questionable information, the agency may order a new
credit report or a field review of the appraisal. In addition, Fannie Mae may check the
comparable sales to verify that they are real and to see whether there are better matches than the
original comps provided.
While the information that Fannie Mae examines for both loans and institutions has not changed
significantly since the 1980's, technology now allows the corporation to aggregate and analyze
more information than ever before. It can compare a given lender's track record to other lenders
on the basis of size, geography, wholesaling success, retailing success, and can control for
property quality, loan size and other factors. While it does track the success of lenders'
wholesale operations, the company does not actually check on the success with specific third-
party originators.
In addition, Fannie Mae is currently preparing to put to work a new database that will help the
agency to complete its quality control functions. With the database, Fannie Mae will be able to
run credit reports on borrowers as well as title searches and comparable sales. Although the title
search function will alert underwriters to land flips and other questionable aspects of a property's
history, Fannie Mae plans to use it mainly to detect hidden secondary financing. Hidden
secondary financing is of particular concern to the secondary markets because such financing
effectively raises the loan-to-value ratio on the property, increasing the risk for lenders and
secondary markets.
These quality control functions represent the secondary markets' attempt to overcome the
remoteness from mortgage origination, selling and servicing that the unbundling process has
created. As the two agencies become more sophisticated at aggregating and analyzing
information, it remains to be seen whether better information will prevent problems from arising.
Investment
The final group of players in the unbundled mortgage market is the investor. Investors
purchase loans either directly from mortgage companies or, more often, from Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac and other secondary market entites in the form of whole loans, participations
or mortgage-backed securities. Commonly, investors are pension funds, insurance
companies, and other institutional investors seeking long-term, low-risk investments.
Some investors buy Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac MBS because they believe that these
corporations' association with the federal government makes their securities especially
safe, but all investors count on the secondary markets to control for quality and to analyze
accurately the credit risk in each mortgage sold as a security or other type of investment.
It is questionable whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have actually been able to price
their securities in a way that accurately reflects the high risk of buying in an unbundled
market.
Conclusion
The unbundled market represents a radical change from the old mortgage market, where
most players had a long-term stake in the process. In evaluating the true risk level of
loans bought and sold within this market, it is necessary to analyze performance incentives
for different players in this new market. The secondary markets must be able to quantify
the difference in risk between a loan made by a Hibernia Bank and a loan made by a
Sterling Mortgage Company, and to use those calculations to guide their decisions about
the prices at which they buy and sell mortgages.
CONCLUSIONS
An Analysis of the Real Estate Markets in Codman Square and Some
Recommendations for Action
In this conclusion, I will try to bring together the two main pieces of this thesis:
foreclosures in Dorchester and the unbundled mortgage market. I will argue that for most
of the Codman Square NDC's service area, three factors, the housing stock, low-income
residents and low rates of owner-occupancy, create a market that is at special risk for high
rates of speculative investment leading to foreclosure and abandonment. Finally, I will
make some recommendations for how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should change their
policies in order to remove some of the existing incentives for speculative investment, in
order to help prevent similar disasters from happening in the future.
A Model for the Dorchester Market for Triple-Deckers
The unbundled mortgage market is the end result of a revolution in the institutional
framework that makes up the mortgage lending business. The development of the
secondary mortgage market has played a large role in the dramatic alterations that the
primary mortgage market has experienced. As we have seen in the preceding two
chapters, the new, unbundled mortgage market is not only highly profitable, but because
of its efficiencies and increased competition among primary lenders has also made
mortgage credit less expensive for borrowers. Consumers have much more choice about
mortgage products and interest rates than at any time in history. All of these are positive
improvements, for people in Dorchester and nationwide.
The down side, however, is that most of the players in the primary mortgage market are,
and have been since the mid-1980's, driven largely by origination fees, brokers'
commissions and other up-front profits that are determined largely by the volume of loans
and sales that they make. In places like Somerville, this phenomenon may contribute to an
increase in foreclosures especially when particularly reckless lenders concentrate their
activity in the town, but the general stability of the market helps to keep the problem from
becoming overwhelming. In particular, this stability is characterized by what the real
estate journalist Ada Focer has called a "home grown" demand for owner-occupied triple
deckers, both from Somerville natives who wish to remain there and from households who
would prefer to purchase in Cambridge but cannot afford to do so.52
What distinguishes Dorchester from Somerville is that the market for owner-occupancy of
small multifamily properties has been steadily weakening for nearly a generation, leaving a
wide opening for speculative buyers of these properties. For most of the sub-
neighborhoods and sub-real estate markets that make up the Codman Square NDC's
service area, with their combination of small properties, low-to-moderate income residents
and low rates of owner-occupancy, this unbundled market can contribute to disaster when
the institutions that determine who receives credit in a neighborhood have little or no
long-term stake in the future of the neighborhood and the properties within it. The result
is that even if inner-city properties and triple deckers make up a relatively portion of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's portfolios, problem loans on those properties are likely to
be concentrated in a very small set of geographic areas. The following economic model
will help to explain why it is that Dorchester is at higher risk for speculative investment.
In urban economics, the classic monocentric model of competition5 3 for housing purchases
says that every household makes a simple trade-off between housing costs and commuting
costs when deciding how much to bid on the unit of housing that the household will
52Conversation with Ada Focer, May 10, 1994.
5 3Arthur O'Sullivan, Urban Economics, Second Edition, Homewood, IL, Richard Irwin, Inc., 1993,
Chapter 8.
occupy. In general, land is assumed to be cheaper as one moves farther from the city, so
larger units of housing (i.e., houses as opposed to apartments, or houses with larger lots)
are assumed to be cheaper in the suburbs than in the city. In addition, the monocentric
model assumes that as people's incomes rise, they undergo an "income effect" that makes
them want to buy more housing as their salaries rise.
In 1956, the economist Charles Tiebout 54 expanded upon the monocentric world by
proposing his theory of pure public goods. In Tiebout's world, consumers of housing not
only consider housing and commuting but also consider a bundle of goods and services
provided by the area in which they buy (or rent) their home. What these two models
suggest, then, is that the wealthy will be inclined to bid on housing outside the city
because the poor will not be able to bear the high level of commuting costs required to live
in the suburbs, and the wealthy will win those bids for suburban housing. Second, the poor
will win bids for housing inside the city, since their inability to pay commuting costs as
well as their inability to compete with wealthy people in the suburbs will leave them with
the city as their only housing location choice. Finally, if the poor and even the middle
class are also minorities, discrimination in suburban towns (and in some urban
neighborhoods) may also play a role in restricting their housing bids to specific inner-city
neighborhoods.
Although poor people and minorities often have to compete for a stock of housing that is
a) low in quality and b) an insufficient number of units to house them, the monocentric
model argues that they will largely compete against each other when they bid on housing
in the city. In neighborhoods like Dorchester, however, we need to introduce another
player into this housing market model, namely, investors in properties. Because housing
finance is divided by the secondary markets and therefore the primary markets into two
54Charles Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Poltical Economy, October 1956.
categories, single-family (one-to-four units), and multifamily (more than four units), and
because investors can get mortgages in either category but owner-occupants can only get
mortgages in the one-to-four category, homeowners compete with investors in the one-to-
four family category. In particular, investors are most likely to bid for fours, threes, twos
and ones in that order, and homeowners go in the opposite direction, because investors
prefer a larger income stream and more "rentable" units, and because homeowners prefer
to get as close to the single-family home as they possibly can.
When considering the Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation's service
area in light of these various purchasers of small properties, there are two key points to
keep in mind. First, the service area contains a variety of sub-markets, but for the
purposes of this discussion we will focus on two major markets. One market is the market
for single-family Victorians, arguably the most desirable properties in Dorchester and
often located in the safest portions of the service area. This market is, and was during the
1980's, almost entirely dominated by owner-occupants, many of whom are upper-income
professionals prepared to bid high for these properties. Investors are unlikely to compete
in this market, because they are unwilling to bid at the level that the owner-occupants set.
There are two neighborhoods in the service area, Ashmont Hill and Melville Avenue-
Wellesley Park, that fit this description.
The second major market in the service area, which is far more characteristic of the
Codman Square neighborhood, is the market for multifamily properties. Although in
general owner-occupants prefer to bid on single or if necessary two-family properties,
triple deckers have traditionally represented the least expensive way to move into
homeownership, particularly for immigrants who often view multifamily properties as an
opportunity to house extended families and lower-income households looking for a
foothold in the world of homeownership. There are two key differences between these
two markets, differences which were especially pronounced during the 1980's. First, the
owner-occupants with the most cash, the greatest likelihood of being fluent in English, and
the most opportunities to gain information about the local market gravitate toward higher-
value single family homes and bid largely against each other, while the owner-occupants
with the smallest amount of cash, the least likelihood of fluency in English, and the fewest
opportunities to gather information about the real estate market will gravitate toward
triple deckers and compete with investors to buy them. Second, the owner-occupant
market for triple-deckers is a fairly weak market, because the potential buyers have
marginal incomes, many of the properties are in unsafe neighborhoods, buildings are often
old and in need of repair, and conventional financing can be hard to obtain for a low-
income buyer purchasing an older, multi-unit property in an inner-city neighborhood. The
weakness of this market leaves an opening for investor-owners that simply does not exist
in Dorchester's single-family market or in other real estate markets with heavy owner-
occupancy.
When investors bid for housing, their participation almost certainly alters the market, for
several reasons. First, investors are likely to be able to outbid owner-occupants, because
if purchasing and owning rental housing is their business, they are likely to have more
access to equity for a downpayment than a single owner-occupant, especially one of low
or moderate income. One example of this is the so-called "low-doc/no-doc" mortgage
programs of the 1980's, where for purchasers who made substantial downpayments of
50% or more, lenders were willing to grant mortgages with very little documentation
provided by the borrower. In many cases, a group of investors would each put in a small
fraction of the downpayment, receive a low-doc or no-doc mortgage, and end up
defaulting. This cash advantage on the part of investors is particularly true in the market
for triple deckers, where the poorest owner-occupants participate.
Second, bearing in mind that an efficient market with perfect competition is characterized
by perfect information among all consumers, it is likely that investors have better
information about the local real estate market than owner-occupants. By purchasing
properties regularly over time, having connections with local real estate brokers, attending
foreclosure auctions, and watching the local markets, investors are likely to have
information that is superior to owner-occupants who buy property in the same
neighborhood. One Dorchester realtor stated that "There is a list of a dozen or so local
investors that every realtor knows, and when we need to move a property, we call them."
Again, given that the triple-decker market attracts a lot of immigrants and lower-income
households who may not have the ability or the connections to gather information about
real estate, this market is likely to have a strong information differential between owner-
occupants and investor-owners.
Because its housing market is heavily composed of twos and threes, because poverty and
lack of access to credit have produced fewer native homeowners than in other
neighborhoods, because public safety and other problems have discouraged middle class
families from putting down roots, and because programs like HUD 235 and B-BURG
have historically led to high rates of foreclosure and therefore opportunities to pick up
bargain properties at auction, Dorchester has a long history of investor-owners purchasing
small properties. Investors in a neighborhood like Dorchester are not necessarily
detrimental to the neighborhood. Although Dorchester has always had its share of
slumlords, there are also small property owners in Dorchester who buy twos and threes,
fix them up, and manage them responsibly or sell them after adding substantial value to
them. These people help to maintain and increase the area's stock of decent, reasonably
priced rental housing. In both of these cases, the investment objectives of the owners are
either to hold the property over the long term and benefit from the cash flow that the rent
provides, or to sell faster but with substantial value added.
However, during the 1980's, the combination of rapidly rising home values and the
increasing availability of mortgage credit allowed a new breed of investor with a different
set of objectives to enter the property market in Dorchester and elsewhere. Instead of
viewing housing as a residence, and a long-term investment, these investors saw it as a
speculative investment like any other, to be held for as short a time as possible and sold
for the highest attainable profit. If the investor misrepresented himself as an owner-
occupant, he could invest with a very small capital risk on his part of 10% or so. When
the investor was part of a land-flipping scam, buying and selling the property in very rapid
succession, that margin of equity became smaller and smaller until he was almost entirely
risking borrowed money that the investor probably did not intend to pay back.
Out of the experience of the 1980's, then, emerges two main landlord prototypes. The
first is the traditional "property landlord," who buys property as an investment and holds it
over the long term; seven years is considered the time horizon for most real estate
investments. Property landlords can fall into two general categories: those who maintain
their properties responsibly, thereby making a contribution to the neighborhood, and those
who act as slumlords, holding onto properties over the long term without much attention
to maintenance. In both cases, these landlords expect to profit from rent; the landlord
who maintains and adds value to his property also expects to profit from increased value
at the time of sale but like an owner-occupant sees this profit as the result of equity and
value build-up over a relatively long time period. The other type of landlord is this new
breed, the "cash landlord" whose goal is to use as little equity as possible to obtain a
return on his investment in as short a time he can. The radical difference between the
investment objectives of these two types of landlords is best exemplified by some research
conducted by Ada Focer, who in the process of documenting transactions on houses in the
Four Corners neighborhood learned from the tenants there that they did not know who
owned their building and that no one had ever collected rent from them.55 Clearly, these
property owners anticipated profits from these properties that were far bigger than the
rent represented.
It can be argued that because both owner-occupants and long-term investors purchase
property for the purpose of holding over a relatively long period of time, these two
"bidders" on property will be willing to pay roughly the same price for their properties.
Even the greater ability of investors to raise cash for equity and perhaps to have better
access to information about the markets is somewhat mitigated by the fact that owner-
occupants have always enjoyed an advantage because the secondary markets' loan-to-
value ratios favor owner-occupants.
However, if we assume that the cash landlord had in mind a quick turnaround with a huge
windfall, he would have been willing to pay at least enough to outbid the owner-occupant
and the property landlord. And, if he was willing to misrepresent himself as an owner-
occupant, he would erase the disadvantage presented by his higher downpayment
requirement. If this happened just a few times, appraised values would go up enough to
make property values rise for all buyers no matter what their intent. Furthermore, once
these cash-investors sold their properties at additionally inflated prices, sometimes at arm's
length and sometimes to friends or colleagues, appraised values would rise further. In
other cases, mortgage companies were so desperate to do a high volume of loans that they
dictated to appraisers what the values of particular properties would be. So, a market that
was already on the upswing began to spiral upward even more rapidly.
Under this scenario, all bidders for properties in Dorchester were forced to pay higher
prices for the homes that they purchased, and they did. By 1988-1989, however, two
55Conversation with Ada Focer, May 10, 1994.
things happened. First of all, as discussed in Chapter Two, Fannie Mae changed its
underwriting guidelines in 1988, which squeezed the market for 3's and 4's in particular
and removed a lot of potential buyers, both investor-owners and owner-occupants, from
that sector of the housing market. Second, values were at such a record high that owner-
occupants and landlord-investors found it increasingly difficult to bid for these properties,
and many of them simply disappeared from the market. An already thin market became
even thinner, and real estate brokers, mortgage bankers, appraisers and other volume-
driven players literally created transactions just to put dinner on the table every night. It is
likely that many if not most of these transactions involved no downpayment at all, and that
the owners of the properties purchased them never intending to make the first mortgage
payment on them. The result of this process was a wave of foreclosures that has included
these cash landlords as well as long-term investors and owner-occupants who held large
mortgages on properties whose values have plummeted. This decline in values as well as a
credit crunch made it very difficult to sell properties in the early 1990's, and the
foreclosure epidemic began in earnest in 1991, and heated up in 1992 and 1993.
Now that the crash has come, as was inevitable after such inflated growth, it is the long-
term investors, both owner-occupants and absentees, who are suffering from the decline in
property values in the Codman Square service area. Some have lost their properties,
unable to make their payments on such high mortgages. Others have lost all of their
equity and are either trapped in their homes or will lose them to foreclosure eventually.
The drop in equity has meant that few were able to take advantage of the refinancing
opportunities that the decline in interest rates offered. Even middle-class and upper-
middle class owners in markets like Ashmont Hill are suffering. Their homes have lost as
much as 50 to 60% of value, and even though their higher incomes may allow them to
maintain mortgage payments, they may be unable to pay other bills or save for the future.
Some observers of this market have argued that Dorchester's foreclosure problem is
merely the result of an overheated market in which the institutions involved were badly
burned and have since learned their lessons. They argue that the problem is gone now and
that the threat of being cut off by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or by seller-servicers in the
case of third-party originators is enough to keep mortgage originators in line. To some
extent, this is true. Many of the institutions responsible for originating these loans have
now failed and are gone from the marketplace. Fannie Mae deserves commendation for
tightening up its quality control procedures and requirements. Banks that survived the
real estate crash have tightened up their underwriting practices and are more cautious
about the loans they make.
But are these things enough? I would argue not. First, the damage done to the real estate
market will not be easily repaired. With crime, schools and other factors driving as many
buyers as can afford it to purchase in the suburbs, the thin market in Dorchester is
weakening further. Second, even if some of the worst originators have been weeded out,
the individuals who worked for those organizations have in some cases resurfaced at other
institutions. Third, although some of the recent foreclosure sales have led to first-time
homeownership opportunities that will stabilize those properties and hopefully the streets
on which they are located, history and the weakness of the market tell us that in many
cases these foreclosed properties will continue to be owned by investors, who know that
foreclosure sales are a great opportunity to pick up properties for very little money. We
have already observed some foreclosure sales in which properties were bought for
$15,000 or $20,000 and sold for double that amount in a month or so, such a small period
of time that there is no way that amount of value could have been put into the property, so
we must assume that a new wave of speculative buying and selling is starting in
Dorchester. Fourth, the elements that have always put Dorchester at risk have not
changed: low incomes, high rates of investor-ownership and a housing stock dominated
by triple deckers. Fifth, if mortgage companies trying desperately to stay afloat were in
part to blame for some of the fraudulent transactions of the late 1980's, we are about to
see a lot more hungry mortgage companies as interest rates rise and the refinancing wave
that has kept so many mortgage companies thriving comes to an end. Finally, although
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do maintain tight underwriting guidelines and are improving
their data collection on both properties and seller-servicers, it is not clear that the
secondary market agencies have identified the correct data that they need to gather in
order to prevent cash landlords from gaining access to credit in the future.
Recommendations
Given that Dorchester, and presumably other similar neighborhoods, have the above
reaction to the unbundled market, what can we do to close some of the loopholes that
allow such risky transactions to slip through? The best way to accomplish this goal is to
find a way to rebundle the mortgage market, or at least to replicate some of the strengths
of the bundled market, the banks in particular and other players as well have a long-term
stake in the real estate market of the neighborhood in which they lend and therefore watch
the market carefully. As the leaders and as key beneficiaries of the unbundled mortgage
market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac need to play a key role in any solutions to the
problems of credit accessibility for speculative investors. In addition, their federal charters
and their mission statements, at least on the part of Fannie Mae, suggest that they play a
role in helping all Americans have easier access to housing, which therefore gives them the
responsibility to deal with this problem that has increased urban blight and damaged
property values for long-term investors in the inner city.
The two most important elements that need to be reintroduced are 1) accountability for
the players involved in the front end of the market and 2) monitoring of the real estate
market and the transactions that take place within it. At the same time, we also need to
find ways to discourage speculative investing by cash landlords. The following section
will build upon these broad categories of recommendations and make some suggestions as
to how these goals might be attained.
1. Accountability for front-end players.
Currently, there are two major ways that the secondary markets can sanction the behavior
of their seller-servicers with regard to the quality of the loans that the seller-servicers
originate. First, the GSEs can require that sellers repurchase loans that have problems in
their underwriting. Second, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can cut off their relationship
with a seller-servicer who repeatedly sells badly underwritten or fraudulent loans. The
problem with these two methods, however, is that unless the GSEs happen to catch a
problem loan through a random review, they will be unable to detect a problem until after
the fact, when there is a default. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be able to recoup their
losses by forcing a repurchase in the case of problem underwriting, but the neighborhood
is still left with a foreclosed property and all of its attendant problems.
In order to make seller-servicers truly accountable for their actions, there are two options.
First, there may be an argument for "rebundling" some of the roles that are currently split
up. One way to accomplish this goal is by requiring that in neighborhoods with markets
like Dorchester, appraisals, origination, servicing or some combination of these functions
be handled by community-based organizations or locally-invested lenders. Second, it may
be a mistake for sellers to relinquish all credit risk on the loans that they sell to the
secondary market. Fannie Mae is currently launching a pilot program which allows more
generous loan-to-value ratios on owner-occupied 2-4's with the originating lender keeping
a percentage of the credit risk; this program is worth studying to see whether seller credit
risk makes lenders more interested in the long-term success of the loans that they make.
2. Data-gathering and monitoring by the secondary markets. Today's computer
technology allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to track more data about their loans and
seller-servicers than ever before. The following are some recommendations about how to
use it.
. As Chapter Four points out, Freddie Mac currently maintains a blacklist of
mortgage originators from whom they will not purchase loans directly or indirectly.
Fannie Mae should adopt the same practice. Both entities should be more aggressive
about monitoring their seller-servicers to ensure that they do not do business with
third-party originators with histories of fraudulent lending or hire those individuals into
their own organizations.
. Fannie Mae currently has the capacity to aggregate loan data from its sellers that
includes a breakdown of whether the loans in question were wholesale or retail loans.
The institution should expand that database to aggregate data about the default rates
of loans made by specific third-party originators, in order to detect situations in which
bad loans are widely spread among different seller-servicers. Freddie Mac should
follow the same practice.
. Although Fannie Mae's Bob Engelstad has said that the institution will soon have
the capacity to do twenty-year title searches in-house on the properties for which they
buy mortgages, it is not clear that Fannie Mae actually intends to use its data capacity
for that purpose. Both institutions should require full title searches and all of the
information contained therein to be a part of the file for any loan that they purchase.
Title certification is not enough, because a full title search can reveal a lot of
information about the history and real value of the property in question. For
properties in high-risk areas such as Dorchester, secondary market underwriters
should review this title, and just as they sometimes require that appraisals be
reconducted by a second party, they should also require additional title searches if
there are questions about the original search.
. Finally, and most importantly, the secondary markets should assign a special urban
data-gathering unit to detect markets that cash landlords have entered. Although it is
difficult to detect a cash landlord at the time that he or she is initially borrowing, it is
easy to find markets that have small multiunit properties with very rapid turnover, and
that is the key sign that there is speculative activity in the market. Once the secondary
markets have identified these high-risk areas, they can begin to identify specific
properties, buyers and sellers that pose especially high risk or appear to be involved in
land-flipping schemes. After identifying the sales that are based on rapid turnover or
flipping, the unit should assign an appraisal expert to remove the artificial values
represented by those sales from the list of comparable sales, and produce comparables
that more accurately reflect local property values. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
should then require that their seller-servicers adopt these more accurate property
values when originating mortgages. The information gathered through this process
leads into the final set of recommendations, which involves removing the incentives for
speculation.
3. Creating a disincentive for speculative investment.
Since it is difficult to identify a speculative buyer at the time of investment, and because
each time a given speculator borrows he or she may use a different loan officer or
mortgage originator, it may not be possible to simply refuse credit to speculative buyers.
Therefore, it is necessary to remove them from the market by taking away their profit
motivation for being there. Creating more accurate comparables will begin to achieve that
purpose by reducing the amount of the mortgage that a speculator, as well as whoever he
or she plans to sell to ultimately, can obtain. However, under this scenario speculators
will still be able to access mortgage credit with a relatively small down payment. A more
effective method of reducing incentives for speculation would be to require a very high
downpayment of 50% or 60% for properties sold within a given period, for example one
year, of their previous sale. Only by forcing speculators to risk more of their own cash
will it be possible to stop them from manipulating Dorchester's residential markets for
their own gain.
While the above recommendations begin to deal with the problems of a speculative real
estate market, they are only the start of solving the problems of destabilization in
Dorchester's housing market. The Codman Square NDC and other local organizations
with the help of the City of Boston and the State of Massachusetts have much work to do
to bring some of the local housing stock back on line as first-time homebuyer
opportunities, long-term investments or mutual housing associations. Owner-occupants
and struggling small landlords in the neighborhood need access to capital to repair their
properties. With a comprehensive approach that deals with the existing foreclosed and
abandoned stock but also understands how to prevent the systemic problems in the real
estate and capital markets from creating another cycle of speculation, foreclosure and
abandonment, the institutions that play a role in the operation of Dorchester's real estate
market can help it to become healthier.
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Exhibit Three
Methodology for Foreclosure Data Collection
Methodology for Foreclosure Data Collection
Foreclosure data came from the Banker and Tradesman on-line service, a database that
records real estate transactions for parts of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island.
The database has information dating back to 1987. The information contained in the
database originates in the registry of deeds for each county covered by the on-line service.
For each entry, the database records address, date of sale, price, buyer, seller, and in some
cases property use, number of rooms, square footage, mortgage amount, mortgage
originator and deed type. Properties can be searched according to region, city or town,
street name, zip code, sale price, property use, or buyer/seller name. Although the on-line
service is not all-inclusive (it does not, for example, include petitions to foreclose) and
does not always contain complete information on every property, it is the most efficient
way to search for a group of transactions such as foreclosures by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.
The specific methodology for locating the 121 properties in the database for this thesis
was as follows:
1. I searched for all 1-to-3 family properties in the 02121 through 02124 zip codes that
had been purchased by Federal National Mortgage Association or Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation. Since the database is not set up to permit searches by deed
type, which would isolate foreclosures, it made the most sense to search by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac as purchasers, since that is how a foreclosure is recorded.1
Although technically my study focused on 1-to-4 family housing, Banker and
Tradesman does not have a separate use category for four-unit buildings; they are part
1 The author was not aware until early April that Banker and Tradesman only began recording
foreclosures as lender purchases in mid-1989. Therefore, it is only possible to present data on foreclosures
beginning with that year, and even for 1989 we should assume that the data underestimates the actual
number of foreclosures.
of the 4-8 designation. Since there was no way to pull out the four-family buildings,
and since four-unit buildings are a relatively small part of the housing stock, it made
sense to restrict my search to the 1-to-3 family properties.
I included in my data files the information on buyer, seller, address, price, date and
property use.
2. After isolating all of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac foreclosures, I discarded all
transactions outside of the Codman Square service area, using a map as well as my
knowledge of the neighborhood. Once I had finished this task, I had the complete list
of all the 1-to-3 family properties foreclosed upon by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
during the past five years.
3. Next, I conducted a separate search on each address that had been turned up by the
previous search. In this way, I could track the history of all transactions on the
property. The key information to be gathered through this search included several key
elements. First, the search could detect land flips, which show up as a series of
transactions in a short period of time (sometimes as little as a few weeks and other
times as long as a year) on the same property, in which the price of the property
escalates with each transaction. Some flips are also detectable because the participants
in the transaction have the same last name, or because particular names show up
repeatedly.
The second major piece of information that the address search elicited was the names
of the lenders involved in the original transaction for the mortgage on which the
secondary market eventually foreclosed. There were two categories of properties for
which the mortgage lender was not available: those for which mortgages were written
prior to the time period covered by the database, and those for which the lender
information was simply not included in the transaction record. It was possible,
however, to record lenders for 57 of the properties, and the patterns in this
information will be discussed below.
4. My next task was to determine whether these properties had been owner-occupied or
investor-owned at the time of the foreclosure. Although there is no completely
reliable way to determine owner-occupancy, I used three resources to help determine
occupancy status. First, I used telephone books for the year prior to the foreclosure,
and looked up the name of each property owner on whom Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac had foreclosed. I soon realized, however, that there were too many variables that
determined whether I could find a name or not. Missing names might be unlisted
numbers, households without phones, or residents of an area not included in the
Boston directory. In other cases, phones might be listed under the name of another
family member, who in some cases might have a different last name. The second
method to determine owner-occupancy was the reverse telephone directory, which
allows a user to look up an address or phone number and see the names listed there.
Although this search turned up some additional verifications of investor-owned or
owner-occupied, it also does not account for unlisted numbers, households without
phones, or phones listed under another name. Finally, we went back to the on-line
database and searched by the names of every property owner to see whether they
owned multiple properties. If they were listed as owning more than two properties, I
listed them as an investor-owner, even though there was no way to tell whether the
foreclosed property had been a primary residence. I assumed that the ownership of
multiple properties indicated a higher credit risk on the part of the property owner, and
therefore could have been a factor in the mortgage default and/or a predictor of higher
credit risk than an owner with only one property. 2
2 Although this method does not determine whether the foreclosed property was a primary residence or
not, I assumed that an owner of multiple properties was automatically at higher risk of defaulting on his
or her mortgage than an owner of just one or two properties. In fact, the most recent version of Fannie
Mae guidelines state that the agency will not purchase a mortgage written to a property owner who owns
four or more properties, indicating that the secondary markets recognize multiple investment properties as
a major risk factor for default.
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Exhibit Five
Database of Foreclosures by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman
Square NDC's Service Area
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman Square Service Area
No. Street Name Units Date Buyer Seller Owner-Occupied Price Lender Mtg. Amt Foreclosure
33 Algonquin St 10/3/88 Harris C. Johnson Kottman Marj Est $130,000 Merchants Mtg $104,000
33 Algonquin St 3 12/17/90 FHLMC Harris C. Johnson no $120,093 yes
35 Alpha Rd 12/1/88 Richard Towns Lennox Z. Rodney $237,000 New Boston Mtg $189,600
35 Alpha Rd 3 10/9/92 FNMA Richard Towns no $224,722 yes
35 Alpha Rd 10/9/92 Edna J. Hadrick FNMA $81,900 FNMA $77,805
41 Alpha Rd 2/10/89 T. Marc Giroux Thomas W. Lincoln $157,900 Progressive Cnsmrs $126,200
41 Alpha Rd 3 10/27/92 FHLMC Alpha Rd RT 41 no $224,492 es
41 Alpha Rd 4/21/93 Clifton Owens Barclays American $65,000 Boston Five $45,500
122 Armandine St 2 12/11/92 FHLMC Ranel B. Sinclair don't know $142,590 yes
122 Armandine St 12/13/93 Austin A. Mcleod FHLMC $20,000
Aspinwall Rd 3 11/8/93 FHLMC Philliman Menzie don't know $87,406 yes
3 Bailey St 8/14/87 William H. Weathersby Carol R. Home $185,000 Provident Fncl Svc $129,500
3 Bailey St 12/30/93 Donna Ible FNMA $60,000 Huntington $58,710
3 Bailey St 3 4/5/93 FHLMC William H. Weathersby no $234,438 yes
8 Bailey St 1/4/94 FHLMC James Lombardi no $75,000 yes
22 Bailey St 6/30/88 Alliance Funding Co GemJackson $46,500
22 Bailey St 1 4/5/93 FNMA Terence Murray yes $90,900 yes
22 Bailey St 6/30/93 Joel A. Samuel Bay Loan Inv Bk $64,900 FNMA $61,650
87 Bailey St 3/3/89 Martin McGowan Patrick J. Fahy $205,000 Northeastem Mtg $184,500
87 Bailey St 12/14/93 FNMA Martin McGowan yes $63,000 yes
85 Ballou Ave 3/6/87 Mark E. Grannum Doretha Mizell $1,000
85 Ballou Ave 4/24/92 Huntington Mtg Josephine Grannum $127,335
85 Ballou Ave 1 6/19/92 FNMA Huntington Mtg Co don't know $127,335 yes
8 Bloomfield St 8/2/88 Joseph E. Douyon Stephen W. Bostwick $183,000 Keystone Mtg Corp $163,000
8 Bloomfield St 3 9/16/93 FNMA Joseph E. Douyon don't know $68,000 yes
107 Bloomfield St 5/22/90 Anne M. Brennan Domenic M. Lombardo $69,300
107 Bloomfield St 3 4/22/93 FNMA Anne M . Brennan no $69,300 es
107 Bloomfield St 6/7/93 Greenhays RT FNMA $36,900 Gerald Issokson $36,900
51 Bowdoin St 10/7/92 Paul D. McDonald FHLMC $31,390 Shawnmt Mtg Corp $27,100
51 Bowdoin St 3 8/18/93 FHLMC George Caidoza no $57,684 yes
182 Bowdoin St 9/2/93 Carolyn A. Hall FHLMC $43,000 Fleet RealEst Fndg $40,850
182 Bowdoin St 1 12/1/93 FHLMC Leroy Shillingford no $98,400 yes
351 Bowdoin St 8/6/90 Elizabeth Lefevre Veronigue L. Michelot $210,000 Sterling Mtg Co $188,000
351 Bowdoin St 3 6/25/92 FNMA Elizabeth Lefevre no $43,200 yes
351 Bowdoin St 6/25/92 Jose Carvalho FNMA $25,000
75 Brent St 1 8/18/93 FNMA Ibrahim A. Rashid don't know $71,825 yes
75 Brent St 10/25/93 Zozislaw Dziegielewski FNMA $35,850 Fncl Enterprises $30,000
10 Brenton St 3 12/16/91 FHLMC Jeanette F. Byron no $101,800 yes
10 Brenton St 3/30/92 Reginald Cesar FHLMC $101,800
62 Burt St 4/1/87 Carolyn Doiai Thu V. Doan $160,000 Peoples Fed Svgs Bk $120,000
62 Burt St 3 3/10/92 FHLMC Ha J._Nguyen yes $178,663 --- I--_yes
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman Square Service Area
No. Street Name Units Date Buyer Seller Owner-Occupied Price Lender Mtg. Amt Foreclosure
75 Callender St 8/26/87 Kay M. Khouri Neville Buchanan $142,000 Commonwealth Mtg $128,500
75 Callender St 2 10/23/92 FNMA Solomon G. Hanry don't know $42,500 yes
75 Callender St 5/27/93 Santos Santiago FNMA no $18,500 yes
75 Callender St 9/16/93 Jose L. Vidro Santos Santiago $20,000
4 Carlos St 1 12/1/92 FHLMC Albert M. Pinckney don't know $8,963 yes
7 Centervale Pk 5/1/87 Warren Brackebusch Dorothy L Todd $170,000 Northeastern Mtg $153,000
7 Centervale Pk 4/2/90 Hilton Raymond Hannigan Agnes Es $145,000 Northeastern $137,700
7 Centervale Pk 1 3/19/92 FNMA Stephen Raymond yes $106,250 yes
7 Centervale Pk 10/1/92 Alan McGoldrick FNMA $100,000 FNMA $95,000
11 Champlain Cir 1 3/3/92 FNMA Alberta Mattox yes $84,000 yes
11 Champlain Cir 8/27/93 Virginia V. Bridgerran FNMA $39,000 FNMA $37,050
89 Clayboume St 2/26/90 Brian A. Cohoon Donnie W. Cobb $20,000
89 Clayboume St 3/28/90 Branwyn Merrill-Cook Brian A. Cohoon $111,000
91 Clayboume St 7/22/87 Louis Exilhomme Robert B. Gersten $175,000 Comfed Savings Bk $140,000
91 Claybourne St 3 7/8/93 FHLMC Louis Exilhomme prob. not $118,000 yes
91 Clayboume St 10/1/93 Edith Barthelemy FHLMC $70,000 First Eastern $52,500
89 Clayboume St 2/26/90 Brian A. Cohoon Nellie L Cobb $20,000
89 Clayboume St 8/24/90 Anne M. Brennan Gwendolyn Klutsch $239,900 Premiere Fndg $191,920
89 ClaybourneSt 3 11/10/93 FHLMC AnneM.Brennan no $71,288 yes
Claybourne St 11/2/93 FNMA Abidh Hosein no $126,000 yes
6 Clermont St 1/30/87 Annie Moore Janice B. Joyce $124,000 Comfed Savings Bk $74,000
6 Clermont St 1 5/20/93 FHLMC Annie Moore yes $44,500 yes
6 Clermont St 9/22/93 Donna D. Scarlett FHLMC $75,000 Bancboston $71,250
62 Colonial Ave 7/1/87 Jean-Claude Labissiere Noella Baptiste $55,000
62 Colonial Ave 1 12/2/93 FNMA Jean Claude Labissiere yes $110,351 yes
664 Columbia Rd 1/4/90 Edward M. Fopiano Virginia C. Grammer $132,500 Seller $132,000
664 Columbia Rd 3 4/23/92 FNMA Edward M. Fopiano no $58,500 yes
664 Columbia Rd 7/1/92 David Margill FNMA $64,500 FNMA $58,050
765 Columbia Rd 3 3/19/92 FHLMC Kathleen Fitzgerald yes $218,950 yes
765 Columbia Rd 3 6/21/93 FHLMC Kathleen Fitzgerald yes $244,543 yes
765 Columbia Rd 6/21/93 Joanna Chielminski FHLMC $75,000 Fleet RealEst Fndg $75,269
19 Corona St 8/8/88 Paul Dardano Ronald Gordon $105,000
19 Corona St 12/6/88 Eugene L Flynn Paul Dardano $139,000 University Bk $162,700
19 Corona St 3 12/14/92 FHLMC Daniel J. Flynn no $86,450 yes
19 Corona St 5/7/93 Mariana Vaz FHLMC $59,000 Bancboston $50,150
39 Corona St 6/29/89 Reserve Armand Michelet Leonard $160,000 Commonwealth Uni $144,000
39 Corona St 3 1/7/93 FNMA Reserve Armand no $147,000 yes
39 Corona St 4/30/93 Heriberto Hernandez FNMA $16,900 FNMA $15,210
17 Crowell St 6/1/89 Wilfrid Maingrette Richard D. Malcolm $180,000 Northeastern Mtg $171,000
17 Crowell St 3 2/26/93 FNMA Jeanne Maingrette no $35,250 yes
116 Dakota St 11/16/88 Denis Joseph Tieu V. Dang $158,000 Cap Mtg Co Inc $142,200
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman Square Service Area
No. Street Name Units Date Buyer Seller Owner-Occupied Price Lender Mtg. Amt Foreclosure
116 Dakota St 3 5/20/93 FNMA Anne M. Joseph don't know $81,600 yes
116 Dakota St 12/27/93 SM Joseph Chowdhury FNMA $43,000 FNMA $40,850
4 Darlington St 1 12/3/93 FHLMC Steven B. Hawkesworth don't know $54,100 yes
20 Darlington St 10/31/89 Teresa J. Combs Miihh W. Ha $210,000 Esplanade Mtg Co Inc $189,000
20 Darlington St 3 3/26/93 FNMA Teresa J. Combs no $112,470 yes
32 Devon St 5/11/87 Albert C. Weeks Albert C. Weeks $20,000 Other Private Lender $20,000
32 Devon St 5/10/88 Arthur Banks Devon St RT $131,346 Other Private Lender $30,346
32 Devon St 2 6/24/92 FH LMC Arthur Banks no $90,000 yes
51 Devon St 3 11/27/92 FNMA Paul O'Loughlen no $267,710 yes
51 Devon St 12/24/92 Charles W. Duffy FNMA $34,900 FNMA $27,920
99 Devon St 3 12/4/92 FHLMC Alvin D. Lewis no $42,000 yes
99 Devon St 3/16/93 John F. Powell FHLMC $22,500
124 Devon St 2 6/23/93 FHLMC Johnny S. Young no $44,341 yes
18 Edson St 2/11/88 Gary T. Woods Kenneth R. Bell $15,500
18 Edson St 1/18/89 Cawley Invst Grp ltd Gary T. Woods $12,500
18 Edson St 1/26/93 FHLMC Edward J. Redmond no $105,000 yes
18 Edson St 12/16/93 Edson St RT 18 FHLMC $27,000 Theodore Grossman $30,000
93 Ellington St 11/29/89 Raymond R. McVeigh Michael G. Kenny $225,000 First Eastern Mtg Co $202,500
93 Ellington St 3 9/25/92 FNMA Raymond P. McVeigh no $240,434 yes
10 Epping St 5/5/87 R. Decosta Brenda Daly $145,900 Dire Real Estate Svcs $116,700
10 Epping St 11/13/89 Garden Mgmt Co Inc Reuben Decosta $98,000
10 Epping St 11/28/89 Herbert Riggs Garden Mgmt $121,000
10 Epping St 11/28/89 Agatha Lewis Herbert Riggs $160,000
10 Epping St 2 6/8/92 FNMA Earl Wright no $66,600 yes
10 Epping St 8/14/92 Kuntie Sudhu FNMA $48,900 FNMA $44,010
103 Erie St 7/24/87 Lynne K. Laneau Enid M. Nicholas $12,500
103 Erie St 9/21/89 Edward Fopiano Lynne K. Laneau $201,000 Seller $98,750
103 Erie St 3 2/25/93 FHLMC Edward Fopiano no $169,913 yes
103 Erie St 10/1/93 Rockcity RT FHLMC $12,000
105 Erie St 7/25/87 Lynne K. Laneau Enid M. Nicholas ___________ $12,500 ___________
105 Erie St 9/21/89 Edward Fopiano Lynne K. Laneau $201,000 Seller $98,750
105 Erie St 3 6/9/93 FHLMC Edward Fopiano no $184,261 yes
105 Erie St 10/1/93 Rockcity RT FHLMC $8,000
48 Fowler St 7/27/89 David Crawford Urian A. McKenzie $75,000
48 Fowler St 6/13/90 Theseia N. Tribble David Y. Gyewu $125,000
48 Fowler St 3 8/12/93 FHLMC Theresa N. Tribble don't know $137,123 yes
109 Fuller St 3 7/23/92 FH LMC Bernard A. Donovan no $45,900 yes
109 Fuller St 9/11/92 Calizte Dorisca FHLMC $30,000
196 Fuller St 6/15/89 Lionel Fanfan Jean B. Fanfan $225,000 Commonwealth $180,000
196 Fuller St 3 4/20/93 FNMA Lionel Fanfan don't know $90,100 yes
196 Fuller St 11/4/93 Samuel Hightower FNMA, $74,500 Hyde Park Svg $52,150
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman Square Service Area
No. Street Name Units Date Buyer Seller Owner-Occupied Price Lender Mtg. Amt Foreclosure
23 Gaylord St 3 3/5/92 FNMA Andre J. Alves yes $133,712 yes
23 Gaylord St 4/15/92 A. Alexander FNMA $30,500
343 Geneva Ave 4/4/90 Michael J. Loney Jeffrey E. Roche $230,000
343 Geneva Ave 3 7/27/93 FNMA Michael J. Loney no $72,000 yes
347 Geneva Ave 3/1/90 Paul F. 0 'Brien Jeffrey E. Roche $230,000 Other Private Lndr $205,000
347 Geneva Ave 6/19/93 Jose H. Pena FNMA $50,000
347 Geneva Ave 3 4/2/93 FNMA Paul F. O'Brien no $45,000 yes
359 Geneva Ave 3 2/25/93 FNMA Olegario A. Depina yes $107,100 yes
359 Geneva Ave 12/2/93 Pars Property RT FNMA $20,000
359 Geneva Ave 12/16/93 Hai T. Nguyen Pars Property RT $32,000
423 Geneva Ave 5/13/88 Lawrence A. Lepore 423 Geneva Ave RT $175,000 Leader Mtg Co Inc $140,000
423 Geneva Ave 3 10/23/92 FNMA Lawrence A. Lepore no $100,800 yes
423 Geneva Ave 12/30/92 Jose H. Pena FNMA $59,900
515 Geneva Ave 4/21/89 Miguel Andrade Juan Rosa $179,000 Comfed Savings Bk $161,100
515 Geneva Ave 3 5/13/93 FNMA Miguel Andrade dont know $70,000 yes
515 Geneva Ave 7/30/93 Savitree Buchan FNMA $78,000 FNMA $74,100
164 Glenway St 2 7/22/93 FNMA Everett Hill yes $48,000 yes
187 Glenway St 3 10/21/91 FH LMC Rudolph H. Graham no $157,450 yes
187 Glenway St 11/14/91 Martin C. Ward FHLMC $17,500
187 Glenway St 11/22/91 Rafael M. Neves Martin C. Ward $30,000
36 Holiday St 1 3/4/91 FHLMC WilliamT. King dontknow $92,500 yes
Homes Ave 4/5/93 FNMA Crisaloda Cabral dont know $84,150 yes
11 Iowa St 3 11/16/92 FHLMC Allan J. Brown dont know $133,000 yes
11 Iowa St 6/4/93 Monica D. Brown FHLMC $30,000 Shawrmt Mortgage $93,750
30 Larchmont St 5/24/90 Jean F. Sanon Shiran Ali $173,000 Sterling Mtg Co $155,700
30 Larchmont St 2 3/11/92 FNMA Harold Sanon dont know $101,700 yes
35 Lithgow St 12/22/89 Kenneth Forde Richard D. Malcolm $192,500 Northeastern Mtg $173,200
35 Lithgow St 3 10/4/93 FHLMC Kenneth Forde no $101,700 yes
35 Lithgow St 12/17/93 Jose L. Gonzalez FNMA $62,500 FNMA $562,250
Lithgow St 3 12/2/93 FNMA Yvon Senecharles dont know $63,000 yes
9 Lonsdale St 4/1/88 Patrick J. MacLellan Florence MacLellan $175,000 Plymouth Mtg Co $140,000
9 Lonsdale St 3 8/28/91 FHLMC William P. Olsen no $70,000 yes
9 Lonsdale St 9/24/91 James B. Shields FNMA $62,000 FNMA $58,900
9 Lonsdale St 4/28/93 Tinh K. Do James B. Shields $85,000 Norwest Mortgage $83,172
46 Lonsdale St 6/8/88 Mitchell Nash Conley Helen L Est $140,000
46 Lonsdale St 7/19/89 Ann M. Conroy Lonsdale St RT $175,000 Northeastem $157,500
46 Lonsdale St 3 5/25/93 FNMA Gerard F. Connolly yes $99,000 yes
46 Lonsdale St 12/23/93 Lonsdale RT46 FNMA $35,000
107 Lonsdale St 3 4/29/93 FNMA William Collins no $120,004 yes
15 Mallon Rd 6/8/90 Mario Lefevre Tyrone Kindell $200,000 Sterling Mtg Co $172,000
15 Mallon Rd 3 3/11/92 FNMA Mario Lefevre dont know $85,500 1_Yes
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman Square Service Area
No. Street Name Units Date Buyer Seller Owner-Occupied Price Lender Mtg. Amt Foreclosure
15 Mallon Rd 6/12/92 Miriam Kindell-Raye FNMA $50,000 FNMA $47,500
4 Marlowe St 3 11/25/92 FNMA Kevin J. Parker prob. not $178,868 yes
4 Marlowe St 8/13/93 Radhica Rannarain Knutson Mtg Corp $85,000 Baybank Mtg Corp $85,000
35 Maxwell St 3 2/4/92 FHLMC Pauline S. Narrine no $80,199 yes
35 Maxwell St 12/2/92 Bills RT FHLMC $46,500
25 McClellan St 4/14/93 Fleet Bk of MA NA Omar G. Reid yes $142,833 yes
25 McClellan St 2 5/4/93 FNMA Fleet Bk of MA NA $142,833 yes
25 McClellan St 10/1/93 Alicia L. Reid FNMA $66,000 Fleet RealEst $62,700
6 Melbourne St 9/12/88 John T. Monaghan Ruth A. Dewitt $175,000 Northeastern Mtg $157,500
6 Melbourne St 12/13/88 John C. Flaherty John T. Monaghan $218,000 Northeastern $196,000
6 Melbourne St 3 3/30/93 FNMA John C. Flaherty no $80,750 yes
6 Melbourne St 9/8/93 CDB Realty NT FNMA $39,000
14 Melbourne St 8/12/87 P.J. Crossey Michael J. Coyne $125,000 Northeastern Mtg $125,000
14 Melbourne St 1 2/6/92 FNMA Patrick J. Crossey don't know $111,390 yes
14 Melbourne St 5/1/92 Ba V. Tran FNMA $27,500
24 Melbourne St 3 9/16/93 FHLMC Chanh Q. Trinh yes $60,149 yes
14 Merlin St 1 1/25/93 FNMA Marie Winbush no $32,500 yes
14 Merlin St 12/17/93 Isabelle H. Edwards Colm Dunphy $87,000 Norwest Mortgage $85,129
11 Middleton St 3 5/9/91 FHLMC Patrick L King don't know $87,500 yes
11 Middleton St 11/1/91 Fritz F. Gabriel FHLMC $70,000 Huntington MtgCo $634,000
49 Milton Ave 12/28/90 Leroy W. Myers FHLMC $107,900 Northeastern Mtg $101,600
49, Milton Ave 1 09/22/89 FHLMC Sylvester Mitchell don't know $95,788 yes
70 Milton Ave 1 11/5/93 FNMA John 'hompson yes $42,500 yes
87 Mora St 1 7/30/93 FHMLC Aslyn L Holder no $72,000 yes
* Mora St 3 11/8/93 FNMA Eudes C. Freitas no $81,000 yes
19 Mountain Ave 9/4/87 Elvin Cardona Floyd 0. Craft $117,000 Centrust Mtg Corp $111,150
19 Mountain Ave 1 4/16/93 FNMA Elvin Cardona don't know $142,200 yes
25 Nelson St 2 12/29/92 FHLMC Leroy McLaurin don't know $95,391 yes
25 Nelson St 8/16/93 25 Nelson RT FHLMC $28,340 Shawmut Mtg Co $24,500
55 Nightingale St 11/8/88 Laurent Mathieu Edmund A. Henry $175,000 Conumonwealth Mtg $157,500
55 Nightingale St 3 1/3/94 FNMA Laurent Mathieu no $73,100 yes
100 Nightingale St 5/11/87 Samuel Davids Lany D. Kemp $115,000 Progressive Consnrs $103,500
100 Nightingale St 3 2/2/93 FHLMC Samuel Davids don't know $13,500 yes
100 Nightingale St 4/12/93 Rock City T FHLMC $73,100
300 Norfolk St 1 6/26/91 FHLMC Uri Kutubu don't know $47,847 yes
300 Norfolk St 10/13/92 Herbert Davis FHLMC $15,000
Nottingham St 6/10/87 J.S. Rosa Juan Reynolo $98,000 Commonwealth Mtg $71,600
Nottingham St 2 12/9/93 FNMA Jose S. Rosa prob. not $93,600 yes
7 Oakley St 1 5/27/93 FHLMC Jacqueline L. Larkin don't know $52,010 yes
7 Oakley St 11/19/93 Maria Jesus FHLMC $75,000 BayBank Mtg Corp $63,800
27 Page St 9/30/88 Kenco Rlty James Small $100,000
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman Square Service Area
No. Street Name Units Date Buyer Seller Owner-Occupied Price Lender Mtg. Amt Foreclosure
27 Page St 5/22/89 Patricia Coakley Kenco Rlty Corp $165,000 Norwest Mtg $132,000
27 Page St 3 10/7/92 FHLMC Dolores Murphy no $153,288 yes
27 Page St 4/5/93 Yvette Straughter FHLMC $55,000 Bancboston Mtg $52,250
6 Paisley Park 1 2/28/92 FHLMC Robert R. Swan yes $181,522 yes
6 Paisley Park 6/25/92 Charles L. Clemons FHLMC $92,700 Shawnt Mtg Co $88,000
352 Park St 3/1/90 Charles Carroll Jeffrey E. Roche $250,000 Shawrnt Mtg Co $200,000
352 Park St 3 9/21/92 FNMA Charles Carroll don't know $233,670 yes
352 Park St 11/30/92 Rolene Kendrick FNMA $49,900 FNMA $47,405
27 Pasadena Rd 3 6/14/93 FNMA Grace M. Locker yes $126,485 yes
7 Peacevale Rd 8/15/91 Royal Funding Corp Naomi Williams $30,000
7 Peacevale Rd 1 2/28/92 FHLMC Matthias Williarra dont know $49,830 yes
7 Peacevale Rd 7/2/92 Dennis J. Mahoney FHLMC $48,410 Shawnut Mtg Co $41,100
7 Peacevale Rd 12/17/93 Bertha M. Woods Dennis J. Mahoney $52,000 Mass Cp Bk $20,000
21 Peacevale Rd 7/26/88 Hector Maga Burabe David $80,000 Other Private Lndr $75,000
21 Peacevale Rd 2 3/13/92 FNMA Dariela Maga don't know $160,000 yes
21 Peacevale Rd 7/14/92 Leonard Markir FNMA $32,000
21 Peacevale Rd 4/27/93 Sheri M. Willianm Peacevale Rd RT 21
15 Rosedale St 5/31/90 Lugman A. Ahnad Edith Tharnes $132,000 Northeastern Mtg Co $132,000
15 Rosedale St 1 12/9/92 FNMA Velna D. Blackwell don't know $12,750 yes
15 Rosedale St 5/27/93 Barbara G. Daughtry FNMA $50,000 FNMA $47,500
18 Rosedale St 1 12/27/91 FNMA Rashidah Ahmad don't know $157,255 yes
18 Rosedale St 2/2/93 Winifred Grannum FNMA $29,900 Neworld Bank $60,000
19 Rosedale St 1 8/24/93 FHLMC Pierre L Jacques don't know $34,980 yes
1 Roseland St 2/12/88 H. Patrick Arundel Michael E. Carey $155,000 Comfed Savings Bank $139,500
1 Roseland St 1/13/93 FHLMC H. Patrick Arundel yes $90,000 yes
1 Roseland St 8/13/93 Tuoi Vantruong FHLMC $80,000 Empire of Am Rity Cr $73,440
14 Rosseter St 3 11/4/92 FNMA John C. Ryan prob not $73,000 yes
14 Rosseter St 11/5/92 Marian Sklodowski FNMA $40,900
14 Rosseter St 12/31/93 Jimmy Bland Marian Sklodowski $110,000 Quincy Savings Bk $110,000
15 Santuit St 6/13/89 Patrick J. Naughton P. McLaughlin $195,000 Mass Cp Bk $175,500
15 Santuit St 3 4/2/92 FNMA Patrick J. Naughton yes $71,500 yes
15 Santuit St 4/8/93 Maria Mlcciantuono FNMA $68,000 FNMA $61,200
323 Seaver St 3 2/24/92 FHLMC Everald G. Grant no $28,000 yes
323 Seaver St 7/23/93 Rock City RT FHLMC $16,000
412 Seaver St 2 11/23/92 FNMA Mary A. Rieves don't know $87,300 yes
412 Seaver St 10/25/93 Arnold C. Sprott FNMA $44,500 Neworld Bank $61,050
26 Stockton St 3 12/29/92 FNMA Mazamra T. Davids no $106,281 yes
26 Stockton St 4/20/93 Jeffrey N. Springer FNMA $62,900 FNMA $59,755
35 Taft St 3 10/7/93 FHLMC Paul Bradley don't know $212,677 yes
35 Taft St 10/22/93 Hoa T. Nguyen FHLMC $45,000 Bancboston Mtg Corp $40,500
287 Talbot Ave 3 5/26/93 FHLMC Louis J. Bayard no $48,000 yes
287 Talbot Ave 9/14/93 Karen 0. Elvis FHLMC $58,000 _
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman Square Service Area
No. Street Name Units Date Buyer Seller Owner-Occupied Price Lender Mtg. Amt Foreclosure
67 Tonawanda St 2 3/9/93 FHLMC Margaret B. Reber no $100,000 yes
67 Tonawanda St 12/29/93 Mildred Jameau FHLMC $84,500 Carl L Brown & Co. $84,717
62 Torrey St 2/12/88 David E. Kaye Jonathan Kaye $175,000 Powder House Mtg Co $157,500
62 Torrey St 3 3/9/93 FHLMC David E. Kaye no $55,250 yes
11 Vassar St 2/1/88 Dorel M. Thomas David J. Bowden $173,000 Powder House Mtg Co $155,700
11 Vassar St 3 7/30/93 FNMA Dorel M. Thomias dont know $69,700 yes
11 Vassar St 10/28/93 Jean R. Luc FNMA $27,250
11 Vinson St 11/25/88 Nouphanh Nouphanh Salvatore Napoli $135,000 Lomas Mortgage USAInc $121,500
11 Vinson St 10/1/91 FNMA Viengngeune Viengngeun don't know $135,948 yes
11 Vinson St 12/12/91 Ranarace Ramnarain FNMA $82,500 FNMA $70,000
11 Vinson St 6/11/93 Roxanne Hazelwood Ranmarace Rarmarain $90,500 Boston Safe Dep & Tr $67,875
9 W.Tremlett St 1 6/11/92 FHLMC Steven Copeland don't know $100,357 yes
18 W.Tremlett St 8/3/89 Narine Deodat Shyam Baldeo $195,000 Northeastern Mtg Co $156,000
18 W.Tremlett St 3 6/16/92 FHLMC Narine Deodat no $191,688 yes
18 W.Tremlett St 11/19/92 Loretta Oliva FHLMC $33,900
18 W.Tremlett St 11/19/92 Henraj Rancharran Loretta Oliva $63,000 Conuonwealth United $61,233
52 W.Tremlett St 2/12/87 Jeannette Byron I. Leopold Cymis $132,000 Comfed Savings Bk $105,600
52 W.Trermlett St 3 1/4/93 FHLMC Jeanette Byron don't know $153,975 yes
52 W.Tremlett St 9/1/93 Tyrone Davis FHLMC $16,000
15 Wainwright St 3 2/27/92 FNMA Charles J. Murphy don't know $162,000 yes
15 Wainwright St 4/15/92 Allan Hewitt FNMA $55,000 FNMA $52,000
235 Washington St 1/22/87 John Sullivan Marcus Johnson $70,000
235 Washington St 7/2/88 Edward Fopiano John Sullivan $63,000
235 Washington St 3 11/16/92 FHLMC Edward Fopiano no $180,294 yes
235 Washington St 2/12/93 Cuthbert I. Mayers FHLMC $18,000 Shawnmt Mtg Co $12,600
320 Washington St 3 8/3/93 FHLMC Norman W. Williams no $95,000 yes
411 Washington St 12/14/89 Charlotte E. Graham Jennie M. Dallas $195,000 Northeastem Mtg Co. $175,500
411 Washington St 3 12/27/91 FNMA Herod Graham no $130,500 yes
411 Washington St 12/31/92 Azusa Christian Comm FNMA $25,000
909 Washington St 6/22/88 Gladstone A. Malvo Beavis Mary Est $165,000 Merchants Mtg Co $123,700
909 Washington St 2 12128/93 FHLMC Donovan Malvo don't know $90,000 yes
66 Welles Ave 1/21/87 Solomon Kenea McCready John E. $170,000 Comfed Savings Bk $153,000
66 Welles Ave 1 1/14/93 FNMA Solmon Kenea no $83,000 yes
18 Westcott St 7/28/89 Sara L. Gross Frank L. Walters $145,000 Shawrrut Mtg Co $116,000
18 Westcott St 1 4/21/93 FHLMC Sara L Gross don't know $88,218 yes
58 Westville St 1 4/5/93 FNMA Errol Hinds don't know $88,400 yes
108 Westville St 12/14/89 Efelio Rivera Bloomfield RT 182-4 $110,000 Comnronwealth United $99,000
108 Westville St 2 12/30/92 FNMA Efelio Rivera don't know $89,000 yes
161 Westville St 2/24/87 Joseph Gozzo Margarita Liriano $135,000 Dime Real Estate Svcs $108,000
161 Westville St 3 2/21/91 FNMA Joseph Gozzo no $165,625 yes
161 Westville St 12/27/91 Karen Englehart FNMA $22,000 Barry J. Gordon $27,600
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Codman Square Service Area
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
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161 Westville St 6/8/93 Jacquelyn Salado Francis Fraine $20,000
216 Westville St 4/3/90 Westville St RT Marc D. Koenig $11,455
216 Westville St 3 5/6/93 FHLMC Marc D. Koenig prob.not $79,307 yes
34 Whitfield St 4/13/90 Anne M. Brennan Dorothy Henry $208,000 Sterling Mtg Co $187,200
34 Whitfield St 3 5/14/93 FNMA Anne M. Brennan no $112,500 yes
34 Whitfield St 7/19/93 Shawniat Fin'fl FNMA $31,500
23 Withington St 10/13/87 Emerson B. Springer Violet Davis $160,000 Comfed Savings Bk $144,000
23 Withington St 3 3/19/93 FNMA Emerson B. Springer no $164,400 1 1_yes
23 Withington St 4/29/93 Irene A. Keazer FNMA $59,000 FNMA $56,050
Exhibit Six
Database of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Foreclosures in Somerville
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Somerville
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21-23 Alston St. 3 7/20/89 Yves Isidor Ifeanyi A Menkiti $259,000 University Bank NA $207,200_
21-23 Alston St. 3 4/23/92 FNMA Yves Isidor $144,000 yes
21-23 Alston St. 3 10/19/92 Albin Sun+ FNMA $60,000 FNMA $45,000
16-A Austin St. 3 2/16/93 FHLMC Robert W. Scott $67,200 Yes
11 Cameron Ave. 3 11/14/88 David 0 Ragwar+ Mary A Andella $230,000 Comfed Savings Bk $184,000
11 Cameron Ave. 3 1/5/93 FNMA James 0. Ragwar $134,400 Yes
11 Cameron Ave. 3 1/21/94 David J Bouck+ FNMA $125,000 Shawmut Mtg Co $118,750
162 Central St. 2 6/5/89 Matthew Brennan+ Paul J. Cedrone+ $252,500 Northeastern Mtg Co $227,200
162 Central St. 2 1/5/93 FNMA Matthew F. Brennan $145,800 yes
162 Central St. 2 6/3/93 Marina E. ----- FNMA+ $170,500 Shawmut Mtg Co $161,950
8 Douglas Ave. 2 4/2/90 Jean 0. Senat Phillip E. Goss $190,000 Northeastern Mtg Co $171,000
8 Douglas Ave. 2 4/22/93 FNMA Jean 0. Senat $158,400 yes
8 Douglas Ave. 2 11/1/93 Frederick T. Igoe+ FNMA + $158,400 FNMA $158,400
18 Farragut Ave. 1 10/22/92 FHLMC Laurenco Coelho $75,000 Yes
18 Farragut Ave. 1 2/22/93 Kimberly Smolinksy FHLMC $119,000 First Eastern Mtg Co $75,000
74 Fremont St. 2 9/1/89 Michael McKenna Mary Sprouse+ $240,000 Other Bus Lender $180,000
74 Fremont St. 2 8/12/93 FHLMC Joan M. Mckenna $157,800 yes
74 Fremont St. 2 12/2/93 Yo Yi Chen FHLMC $133,000 $106,400
24 Glendale Ave. 2 4/18/89 Saahnan Azam+ 24 Glendale Ave RT $250,000 Northeastern Mtg Co $187,500
24 Glendale Ave. 2 10/14/93 FHLMC Shama Azam $160,000 yes
24 Glendale Ave. 2 1/13/94 Jenel Cherilus+ FHLMC $132,000 East West Mtg Svcs $105,600
9 Hall St. 1 9/27/93 FHLMC Kevin D. Flynn $76,723 yes
25 Hawthorne St. 2 6/15/88 Verna Richards+ Helen E. McDonald $230,000 BayBank Middlesex $184,000 _
25 Hawthorne St. 2 4/27/93 FNMA Richard C. Mclaughlin $144,000 yes
25 Hawthorne St. 2 8/30/93 Frank C. Ray+ FNMA $141,500 FNMA $127,350
Highland Ave. 2 3/22/94 FNMA Arnold Duclersaint $180,000 Yes
56 Hinckley St. 2 7/29/92 Marine Midland Bank Syed 0. Rahim+ $139,500 yes
56 Hinckley St. 2 9/18/92 FNMA Marine Midland Bk NA $139,500 yes
56 Hinckley St. 2 9/18/92 Dale E. Lorgeree FNMA $85,000 FNMA $80,750
163 Hudson St. 2 10/9/87 Donald F. Luzaitis+ Christopher Reilly+ $249,900 Comfed Savings Bk $199,000
163 Hudson St. 2 6/26/92 FNMA Donald F. Luzaitis $151,200, yes
163 Hudson St. 2 8/13/92 Allison T Gushee+ FNMA+ $136,300 FNMA $122,650
35-37 Jackson Rd. 3 4/9/93 FNMA Michael Keiselbach $137,635 yes
66 Jacques St. 1 10/14/93 FHLMC George Spiliotis $81,090 yes
15 Lee St. 1 6/27/90 Bakhtawa Singh+ Thomas Chandler + $180,000 Leader Mtg Co $162,000
15 Lee St. 1 6/17/93 FNMA Bakhtawar Singh $138,000 es
15 Lee St. 1 3/18/94 Douglas Meacham+ FNMA+ $125,000 Hibernia Savings Bk $100,000
37 Lewis St 3 8/26/88 Pierre H. Grandoit Kathleen P. Maroney $312,500 Comfed Savings Bank $250,000
37 Lewis St 3 9/5/89 Jean T. Duperval+ Pierre H. Grandoit $346,000 Northeastern Mtg Co $290,000
37 Lewis St 3 5/10/93 FNMA Duperval Jean Y. Est $140,250 Yes
37 Lewis St 3 7/13/93 Avtar Singh FNMA $149,900 FNMA $149,900
33 Lexington Ave. 2 5/31/88 Joseph R. Fiorello+ Anne N. Ciccone $237,000 Bank of Boston MA $189,600
33 Lexington Ave. 2 4/12/93 FNMA Joseph R. Fiorello $207,843 yes
33 Lexington Ave. 2 6/17/93 Carlos C. Best+ FNMA $153,800 Shawmut Mtg Co $146,100
1 Linden St. 1 2/26/92 FHLMC Juan A. Fernandez $71,288 yesM
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
Foreclosed One-to-Three Family Properties by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Somerville
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I Linden St. 1 6/15/92 Sharon M. Hall FHLMC $65,000 Shawmut Mtg Co $61,750
335-337 Lowell St. 2 6/30/88 Giuseppe Colomba James F. Reagan $215,000 Pioneer Fin Cp Bk $172,000
335-337 Lowell St. 2 4/22/93 FHLMC Giuseppe Colomba $215,548 y
335-337 Lowell St. 2 1/21/94 Jose H. Carreiro FHLMC $151,000 Shawmut Mtg Co $143,450
398 Medford St. 3 10/5/92 FHLMC Arthur M. Levine $215,015 yes
398 Medford St. 3 12/31/92 Gabriel P. Lorius FHLMC $165,000 Shawmut Mtg Co $148,500
4 Nashua St. 2 3/2/90 Cazmis Kozerski Carolyn R. Wood+ $195,000 First Eastern Mtg Co $135,000
4 Nashua St. 2 10/17/91 FNMA Cazmis Kozerski $154,120 yes
4 Nashua St. 2 10/25/91 Eric S. Bosco FNMA $126,900 FNMA $107,850
21 Newbury St. 2 9/1/89 Fred Syllien Marie A. Conners+ $160,000 Comfed Savings Bank $128,000
21 Newbury St. 2 1/14/94 FNMA Fred Syllien $139,410 1_yes
42 Otis St. 1 8/31/92 FHLMC Maria J. Leite $98,000 Yes
42 Otis St. 1 11/19/93 Joseph D. Grillo FHLMC $59,900 Shawmut Mtg Co $87,950
67 Pearl St. 3 7/8/93 FHLMC Robert W. Scott $161,864 yes
7 Porter Ave. 1 11/16/92 FHLMC Charles F. Fraumeni $121,547 yes
7 Porter Ave. 1 11/3/93 Caryn L. Youngholm FHLMC $84,900 Shawmut Mtg Co $80,650
78-80 Prichard Ave. 3 9/19/89 Sencio Lherisse+ Christos Poutahidis $165,000 Mtg Corp East III $132,000_
78-80 Prichard Ave. 3 1/5/93 FNMA Sencio Lherisse $88,900 yes
78-80 Prichard Ave. 3 11/2/93 Nancy Earley FNMA $150,000 Shawmut Mtg Co $30,000
111 Sacramento St. 1 11/4/92 FHLMC Michael T. Donoghue $60,000 yes
111 Sacramento St. 1 10/29/93 FHLMC Michael T. Donoghue $113,062 yes
111 Sacramento St. 1 12/30/93 Margaret J Butler FHLMC $44,500 E. Cambridge Svgs Bk $35,200
18 School St. 3 5/15/92 FHLMC Mohammad N. K. Mohammad $246,366 yes
40 Temple St. 3 12/28/89 Line Horacius+ Melania Pacchielat+ $232,000 Sterling Mtg Co $208,000
40 Temple St. 3 10/14/93 FNMA Line Horacius $139,500 yes
40 Temple St. 3 2/28/94 Arnulfo Fernandez+ FNMA+ $120,000 FNMA $114,000
31-33 Temple St. 3 9/3/87 Rufino Espitia Stephen A. Miller+ $210,000 Other Bus Lender $168,000
31-33 Temple St. 3 8/27/92 FHLMC Rufino Espitia $201,000 yes
31-33 Temple St. 3 3/12/93 Abdelmajid Laroussi+ FHLMC $98,000 East West Mtg Svcs $78,400
18 Virginia St. 1 8/4/88 Genevieve McCallum Elmas Winters Jr $156,000 Comfed Savings Bank $124,800
18 Virginia St. 1 11/16/92 FHLMC Thomas McCallum $159,166 yes
339 Washington St. 2 8/13/90 Arthur Dasilva+ Jose Machado+ $230,000 Sterling Mtg Co $207,000
339 Washington St. 2 2/10/94 FNMA Arthur Dasilva $119,000
39-41 Waterhouse St. 3 8/21/89 Stephen J. Bremis CosmoTaglino+ $125,500 Central Coop Bank $232,000
39-41 Waterhouse St. 3 8/21/89 Stephen J. Bremis Bruno Ciccariello $125,500
39-41 Waterhouse St. 3 4/2/93 FNMA Stephen J. Bremis $152,100 yes
39-41 Waterhouse St. 3 10/18/93 Christine M. Leblois FNMA $125,000 FNMA $112,500
102-104 Wheatland St. 3 2/24/88 Antonio Andrade Exchange Realty Trust $210,000 Plymouth Mtg Co $189,000
102-104 Wheatland St. 3 8/25/92 FNMA Antonio Andrade $149,000 
_yes
102-104 Wheatland St. 3 10/26/92 Louis E. Carbone FNMA $75,000 1 
_
Source: Banker and Tradesman On-Line Service
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Individuals Interviewed
Jeff Beck, Roger Meade, Robert Pyer, Hibernia Bank
Robert Engelstad, Marlisa Senchak, Fannie Mae
Ann Schnare, Andrea Stowers, Freddie Mac
Patrick Dober, Congressman Barney Frank's office
Steve Sousa, Mass. Mortgage Bankers' Association
Louise Slattery, First Trade Union Bank
John Battaglia, Alice Jamal, Mark Tyburski, Citizens' Bank
Jonathan Crutchley, Crutchley Real Estate
March 10, 1994
March 15, 1994
March 15, 1994
March 16, 1994
March 18, 1994
April 7, 1994
April 7, 1994
April 15, 1994
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